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The Caspian Sea and its littoral have emerged as one of the key areas in the former Soviet 
Union. The region experienced a fundamental change in it geopolitical landscape between 
1992 and 1997, with the emergence of three newly-independent states, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to join the old littoral states Russia and Iran. The subsequent 
re-discovery of large hydrocarbon deposits in the region has served to complicate the 
developing relationships between these states, and between the region as a whole and actors 
from outside the region. By examining the course of two ongoing disputes between the 
Caspian states, over the future legal status of the sea itself, and the export of the region's oil 
and gas via pipelines, the evolving and complex geopolitical landscape of the Caspian region 
will be described. The interaction of state and non-state actors and their interests wil l then be 
analysed in an attempt to gauge the strength of these competing interests and to predict 
possible outcomes of this competition. However, the topic will first be introduced by a brief 
study of the history of modern geopolitics, and a description of the history of some of the 
Caspian region's own history. 
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Chapter 1 
A Short History and Theory of Geopolitical Thought 
Geopolitics is perhaps best described in the words of Martin Ira Glassner (1995). Stating that 
the discipline is just one part of the wider study of political geography, Glassner described 
geopolitics as "the study of states in the context of global spatial phenomena, in an attempt to 
understand both the bases of State power and the nature of States' interactions with one 
another. "' In this chapter the development of 'traditional' geopolitics wil l be described and 
the basic theoretical foundation of traditional and more modern geopolitics discussed. 
Founding Fathers 
The modern European discipline of geopolitics can be said to have had its genesis in two 
pieces of work published within five years of each other in the 1890s. The first of these, 
published in 1890, was that written by the American Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The 
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783". Mahan's work was the first in the field 
that became known as geostrategy, which has been the main influence on modern geopolitics, 
Glassner's definition above being equally accurate in describing geostrategy. Mahan's book 
was received amidst much adulation at the time, as it represented the first attempt, in English, 
to apply systematic geostrategic thinking to naval warfare. Mahan's basic premise was that 
history had shown that the dominant powers of history had all possessed Sea Power [Mahan's 
capitalisation], that this was still the case, and would continue to be so. To back up his 
thinking he took the examples of Rome's victory over Carthage and Napoleon's failure to 
defeat England, claiming that in both cases, "the mastery of the sea rested with the victor ". 
In a classic piece of environmental determinism, Mahan also claimed that a country's Sea 
Power would be proportional to six key factors: its geographical location; its physical 
geography; its size; the size of its population; the "Character" of its people; and the 
"Character" of its government and national institutions. 
1 Glassner, M. I, (1996), Political Geography, (2 n d Ed.), New York: Wiley: 322. 
The other work, possibly of more immediate impact, was "The Laws of the Spatial Growth of 
States" written in 1895 by the German Freidrich Ratzel. In his paper, Ratzel introduced the 
"organic state " concept, which compared the individual nation-state to an animal, with all 
the attendant needs and goals of animals in nature. 
Kjellen and Haushofer 
The two differing approaches to the study of State interaction as represented by Ratzel and 
Mahan's models remained distinct for another twenty years, until blended by Karl 
Haushofer's Geopolitik in the late 1920s and 1930s. In the interim, Rudolph Kjellen, a pro-
German Swede, laid the foundation of Haushofer's chauvinistic Geopolitik with his "The 
State as an Organism" in 1916. Kjellen departed from Ratzel's detached 'scientific' 
approach, and insistence that his comparison of state with organism was only an analogy, and 
instead insisted that the State was an organism, with 'organs' such as government, population 
and physical structure. His view that these organic States were in constant competition and 
that only the fittest would survive found a ready market when his book was translated into 
German in 1917, as many Germans looked to explain their defeat in the First World War, and 
sought ways to rebuild and become a world power. 
Haushofer expanded upon Kjellen's theories with concepts such as lebensraum and used 
various questionable theories on the genetic superiority of the German/Aryan peoples to 
justify Germany's aggressive expansion into Eastern Europe. He also added elements of 
geostrategy, particularly Sir Halford Mackinder's concept of the Eurasian "Heartland" 
(discussed in a moment), which might explain Nazi Germany's early alliance with the Soviet 
Union. Haushofer's German chauvinism and outright racism did much to harm the image of 
geopolitics as a whole, even without unsubstantiated allegations that Haushofer had directly 
influenced Hitler's decision-making throughout the Second World War. 
Fortunately, Haushofer's theories disappeared with the fall of Hitler, but a number of ideas 
survived; the use of maps to convey information to a wide audience, for example. Another 
concept that survived the German school of Geopolitik is that of the "pan-region". 
Haushofer and his colleagues took on a more global view as Germany expanded, and 
eventually identified three possible pan-regions, centred on Germany, Japan and the USA. 
The concept was an interesting one in that the regions under the control of each of these three 
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core countries cut longitudinally across the world's 'environmental resource regions', which 
run latitudinally across the globe. Therefore each pan-region would have great potential to 
achieve autarky, or self-sufficiency in all their essential needs, a term first coined by Ratzel, 
and later adopted by Haushofer. The three pan-regions envisaged saw a German/European 
core dominating an African/Indian periphery, Japan dominating an East and Southeast Asian 
system, and Anglo-America dominating Latin America. With the end of the bipolar world it 
is interesting to see the development of some new pan-regions; America dominating the 
NAFTA countries, and Japan's dominance in the Pacific, although their dominance is based 
on their economic and not necessarily their military power. It is also interesting to note the 
core-periphery structure of Haushofer's pan-regions; the idea of a wealthy, industrialised core 
utilising the resources of a poorer, less developed periphery is one that is easily recognisable 
in some of today's world-models. 
A First World Model 
The first attempt at a geopolitical world model was that of Sir Halford Mackinder, in 1904, in 
his paper "The Geographical Pivot of History". Mackinder's model was based on the 
premise that throughout much of history Central Asia has acted as the pivotal area in the 
affairs of the Old World. Before the advent of the maritime empires, Asiatic horsemen 
originating from areas within this pivot dominated most of the Eurasian continent from its 
heart, mainly by virtue of their superior mobility. Then, from 1492 until around 1900 the 
Columbian era of maritime exploration and expansion saw the world balance of power swing 
away from the 'land-power' of the horsemen to the 'sea-power' of the coastal states, 
particularly Great Britain. However, by the end of the eighteenth century new forms of 
transport and communication technology, most notably the railways, seemed to promise that 
the advantage would swing back to the pivot area, as railways allowed whoever controlled 
the region to make the most of its shorter, internal lines of communication, inaccessible to the 
maritime powers. 
Essentially, the theory described the world as being bipolar, setting land-power against sea-
power, but Mackinder formally divided the world into three tiers. The "Pivot Area" was a 
vast fortress beyond the reach of the maritime powers, the "Outer Crescent" the domain of 
the maritime powers, whose resources were safe from the Continental power, and the "Inner 
Crescent" where land and sea-power would meet, and compete. This inner crescent 
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consisted of Scandinavia, Western Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the 
southern Rim of Asia. (See Figure 1, page 5) 
Mackinder revised his model in 1919, in his book "Democratic Ideals and Reality". He 
again warned of the potential strength of a single power in control of the Pivot area, but the 
pivot had expanded to become a larger "Heartland". It would appear that Mackinder had 
reassessed the relative strengths of land and sea power in favour of land power, perhaps after 
the abortive Gallipoli landings demonstrated the difficulties involved in projecting sea-power 
onto land. It was "Democratic Ideas and Reality" that gave geopolitics the much-quoted 
dictum: 
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland 
Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island * 
Who rules the World Island commands the World 
(*: Eurasia and Africa form the World Island.) 
This elegant summary of Mackinder's conclusion in his 1919 work seems aimed at the 
peacemakers redrawing the map of Europe at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, a 
prime example of Mackinder as a geostrategist, seeking to advise state policy. In this case, 
the geostrategist may well have been heeded, the Versailles treaties creating, or recreating, a 
tier of small states at the heart of Eastern Europe, instead of leaving the Heartland open to a 
single power. 
Mackinder again revised his theory in 1943, at the height of the second World War, but the 
theory was very much a product of its times, and hence rather less relevant in a discussion of 
general geopolitical theory. Mackinder saw the situation in 1943 as the Heartland power -
the USSR combining with the maritime powers around the "Midland Ocean " - the Atlantic 
powers of the USA and Great Britain - to defeat the German threat between them. However, 
the theory has little to say about the rest of the world, perhaps because his world model could 
not cope with the concept of a maritime country —Japan - allying with a potential heartland 
power with potentially disastrous consequences for the liberal maritime powers. 
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Figure 1 
Mackinder's Pivot Area, Inner and Outer Crescents (Top), and 
Cohen's Geostrategic and Geopolitical Regions, and Shatterbelts (Bottom) 
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Models of a Bipolar World 
Following the Second World War, the advent of the USA and USSR as the world's two 
dominant superpowers created a bipolar world system; all states were seen as either Western 
or Soviet-bloc in their political alignment. Initially at least, there could be no middle ground. 
In this context, Mackinder's model of a bipolar world, with the Heartland power facing the 
maritime world, maintained its relevance, influencing Western geopolitical thought for 
decades. In fact, one of the first papers to be published after the war was nearly identical. 
In his paper2 the American Nicholas Spykman suggested that the Heartland power -
America's new enemy, the USSR - was not a threat i f it could be prevented from reaching the 
"Outer Ring", the maritime powers. Therefore, according to Spykman, the activity of the 
Heartland power should be suppressed by control of what Spykman described as the 
"Rimland", which was to all intents and purposes the same as Mackinder's Inner Crescent. 
The logical conclusion of such thinking was the American policy of "Containment". Any 
potential expansion of the Heartland power must be prevented, i f for no other reason than to 
prevent a "domino effect" in other Rimland states who would be weakened by a communist-
controlled neighbour. It was this stated aim of containment that led to the maintenance of an 
American presence in Western Europe, the Korean war and the disastrous intervention in 
Vietnam. Spykman's model of the world would seem to have been an accurate representation 
of the world-view of America's policy up to the end of the Vietnam war. However, the costs 
to America of that grand example of containment in action led to a reappraisal of the 
American establishment's world-view and a somewhat different model of global power-
relations was suggested, by Saul Cohen. 
Cohen's Regionalism 
Saul Cohen published his first model in 19733. It was different from Spykman's primarily in 
its spatial structure. Cohen firstly divided the world into two geostrategic regions, 
functionally defined according to the inter-relations of the sub-regions within them; these 
were the Trade Dependent Maritime World and the Eurasian Continental World. These two 
2 Spykman, N. J, (1944), The Geography of the Peace, New York: Harcourt, Brace. 
3 Cohen, S, (1973), Geography and Politics in a World Divided, as described in Taylor, P.J, (1993) Political 
Geography (3 r d Ed.), Harlow: Longman: 60-63. 
6 
geostrategic regions were then divided into geopolitical regions, five in the Maritime World 
and two in the Continental World. In addition to the seven geopolitical regions, which were 
defined as being regions of similar economic, political and or cultural character, Cohen also 
specified two shatterbelt regions, characterised by their lack of political homogeneity. These 
shatterbelt areas were recognised as being of strategic importance to both geostrategic 
centres, and also as areas where both centres had come measure of influence or an actual 
presence. 'South Asia' was recognised as having the potential to become a geostrategic 
region in its own right. (See Figure 1, page 5) 
Although at first sight this model seems little different from its immediate predecessors, 
Cohen's model was an important departure from previous theories in that it recognised that 
not all areas between the two geostrategic centres were of equal importance. This 
immediately made Cohen's model more sensitive and realistic than Spykman's. Cohen then 
refined his model further, in 1982. As well as recognising Sub-Saharan Africa as a newly-
emerged shatterbelt region, he also recognised the emergence of Europe, China and Japan as 
"first-order" regions, who had some global 'reach' and the ability to challenge the USA or 
USSR in certain circumstances. In addition to allowing for the ability of slightly weaker 
powers to influence events on a global scale, Cohen also went on to categorise all the other 
states of the world as powers of the second- to fifth-order, defined according to their ability to 
influence events beyond their state boundaries. For example, Nigeria, Brazil and India were 
among 27 states assessed as being second-order, having the ability to dominate events in their 
region but not further afield. This notion of orders gave a dynamic, multiple-node model of 
the world, with many overlapping spheres of influence, giving fuller representation of the 
interconnectedness of regions and states, links not represented by the older bipolar models. It 
also more accurately depicted the true capabilities of the two superpowers, recognising that 
other powers could challenge their hegemony under certain circumstances. 
Cohen revised his model again in 1992, to give a still more complex and sensitive description 
of the functional relations between the world's regions and countries. In this latest model, 
Cohen describes the relations between states as the expression of the levels of "entropy" of 
the various nodes (states). Entropy in this context is described in terms of criteria such as 
agricultural and industrial productivity, capital accumulation, levels of technology and 
energy-efficiency in production. States with high productivity, technological capabilities, 
accumulated capital and so on are regarded as having low entropy, while states with a low 
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manufacturing base or low levels of technology or low agricultural yield are considered to 
have high levels of entropy. This definition of entropy differs from the wider thermodynamic 
definition, the constant degradation of energy, as it does not assume a closed system; global 
energy levels are maintained by production, trade, and the movement of people and ideas. 
States which attempt to close themselves off from the free flow of such energies do 
eventually suffer degradation and collapse, but Cohen regards the penetration of such states 
by energy from outside as inevitable, assuming as he does the inherently open and 
interconnected nature of geopolitical entities. 
The relative influence, or global 'reach' of states can then be defined as the product of their 
levels of entropy and their strategic military strength. This influence can be measured by 
criteria such as external trade, immigration or distant military bases. Hence America can be 
seen to have influence across the globe, while powers such as Europe and Offshore Asia 
dominate their region and are in a balanced state with other global powers. States' positions 
in the hierarchy created by such comparative analysis can change with little difficulty; 
Russia, the inheritor to the former Soviet Union, while (arguably) still possessing the strategic 
military capability of a first-order power, is now a second-order economic power, but after its 
inevitable economics restructuring it has the potential to once again become a first-order 
power in both the military and economic fields. 
Cohen then goes on to describe various territories, either subnational, national or regional in 
scale, as "Gateways ". These Gateways are seen as important in the eventual achievement of 
a new global balance of power after the present fluctuations stabilise. These territories are 
seen as potential points of energy transfer and exchange, and therefore assume an importance 
beyond any influence provided by their own levels of entropy or global reach. These 
territories can be examined at a number of scales; the re-emergent Central Europe may be 
regarded as a gateway between the two geostrategic regions, while the newly independent 
Baltic States may act as a gateway between the European region and a resurgent Russian-led 
confederation of former Soviet states. Other potential gateways include the Caribbean and 
Central America. Such gateways seem likely to assume an important role in the achievement 
of what Cohen regards as a new dynamic equilibrium between the world's centres of power. 
In the context of this dissertation, the Caspian basin could perhaps be regarded as another 
gateway between the two geostrategic regions, or between the Islamic Middle East and 
Christian North, or between Europe and Asia, depending on which scale is taken. 
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Theoretical Frameworks: Realism 
All the theories described above were founded in the dominant geopolitical world-view of the 
twentieth century, the realist account, or possibly, in Cohen's (1982, 1992) case, neo-realism. 
The three basic premises of the realist account of state interaction are (a) that the world 
system is anarchic, with no regulating power or regime, (b) the sovereign, territorial nation-
state is the only significant actor on the world stage and (c) relations between states are 
motivated primarily by a desire for power. Neo-realists assume that the last premise is the 
result of a rational wish to ensure the state's security and survival, in an anarchic system 
where no help is available. 
At first sight, the realist account seems fairly persuasive, apparently showing the world as it 
is, rather than how we might like it to be. However, one immediate criticism that can be 
lodged against the realists is that their account is a very limited one, not taking into account 
many of the influences on the activity of states. The realist account is the account of the 
state's power elite, the statesmen and ministers of governments, and really only described 
state interaction in terms of the interaction of these individuals and groups. Yet there are 
many more factors that have to be accounted for in a complete model of the interaction of 
states - the action of multinational corporations is one example, the annual budgets of some 
of these economic giants exceeding those of many states. The realist view is a privileged 
one, which may well accurately describe the world of state governments, but it often falls 
short of describing and explaining the interactions that occur outside that rarefied 
environment. 
Another quite damning criticism of realist geopolitics regards the 'billiard-ball' analogy. To 
assume that all governments exercise complete sovereignty within the territorial space that 
they govern all the time seems naive. It seems obvious on a closer examination that there are 
many outside influences on a given society that infringe in one way or another on the 
sovereignty of the government concerned. These need not be physical intrusions; cultural 
and economic pressures are equally capable of affecting government policy. To relate this 
point to this particular dissertation, the sovereignty of all of the Caspian states has been 
compromised in one way or another, for example, Georgia has been forced to accept strong 
Russian influence over her foreign policy, and a physical intrusion in the form of Russian 
bases, while the other states in the region have been 'persuaded' to accept the presence of 
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Russian troops on their soil, and all their fiscal policies are strongly affected by the demands 
of the International Monetary Fund. Yet neither are these states effectively Russian colonies, 
to be regarded by the realist as part of the Russian state. A l l three states have agendas of their 
own, and act independently and sometimes in defiance of the dominant Russian power. A 
classically realist approach would have difficulty accounting for such a situation, and the neo-
realist account seems equally vulnerable. 
However, it would seem premature to 'write o f f the realist account completely. Presently, 
even weak nation-states have recourse to capabilities beyond those of the strongest 
multinational corporation, or international organisation. The use of large-scale military force, 
no matter how unacceptable it may be or may become, still rests almost exclusively with the 
governments of nation-states, and this is likely to remain the case. It is certainly the case that 
economic power is now becoming more and more important relative to military power, but in 
many cases economic intervention, for instance sanctions or tariffs, is irrelevant; economic 
sanctions have not stopped Serbian aggression, or toppled the dictatorial regime in Iraq. 
Therefore, the ability to wage war is still an important factor in the interaction of states. It 
must also be realised that the realist account of geopolitics will continue to be relevant while 
it has a voice amongst national decision makers. Those decision makers have the power to 
shape the world in a number of ways and while that is the case, the realist account will 
accurately model state activity. This is particularly true when discussing relations among the 
post-Soviet states: Russia's policy makers are more often than not 'traditional' in their 
geopolitical thinking. Economic, foreign policy and resource issues are security issues as far 
as the Kremlin is concerned, so Russian policy is generally shaped by the security organs, 
who seem to regard any interaction with their neighbours in a highly realist 'win or lose', 
'zero-sum' context. 
Critical Geopolitics 
In response to the criticisms above, as well as many others, there has recently been a move to 
find an alternative account of geopolitics. This has led to the formulation of a critical 
geopolitics. Critical geopolitics emphasises a world of connections and energy flows, of 
inter-state co-operation, as well as questioning the traditional assumption of the sovereign, 
territorially bound state. The critical view of the nation-state is that it is not an entity that it 
fixed through time, but rather that the nation-state is only a recent phenomenon, and not one 
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that will necessarily last much longer. As is pointed out, while it seems to be assumed that 
the state is sovereign within its own territory, the reality is that the state must constantly 
reinforce that sovereignty i f it is to maintain it. It is this fact, amongst a host of others, that 
leads critical geopoliticians to question the validity of a model that emphasises the primacy of 
the state, and attempt to construct an alternative. 
The primary assumption of critical geopolitics is that a state-based account cannot accurately 
describe the world as it is experienced by the majority of those living in it. Instead, 
geopolitics must reflect the world as a system of interconnected entities operating at all 
scales, whether at a local, national or international level. In such a system, local issues 
impinge on international political activity and vice versa, and a dynamic system of energy 
flows is created. States are no longer containers of energy, but connections in a global system 
of energy flows. In such a world, the significance of boundaries and territory is questioned, 
and the territorial nation-state becomes only one of a number of actors. In the critical 
account, local environmental movements, international organisations such as the IMF or the 
UN, nation states and non-governmental organisations generate a dynamic landscape of 
connections and energy flows. In such a landscape, a more complex and variable 'balance' of 
power becomes inevitable. 
Critical geopolitics also places more emphasis on co-operation than realism, pointing to the 
durability of many international regimes, and the increasing shift towards a co-operative 
approach to global problems. In contrast to the realist view that international co-operation is 
a temporary strategy designed to further the individual states' interest, co-operation is viewed 
as a rational way of minimising uncertainty and anarchy in the world system. The ever-
increasing number of international regimes designed to facilitate arms control are a good 
example of this; i f states are confident that their neighbours are abiding by such a regime, all 
parties feel more secure, reducing their expenditure on arms and generating yet more security. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible for proponents i f the critical approach to ignore the realist 
account altogether. As mentioned earlier it still provides an accurate picture of the activities 
of one sort of actor on the world-stage, the state. It could also be suggested that the 
continuing growth of international arms-control regimes, and the durability of organisations 
such as the UN, is in fact perfectly in line with a realist or neo-realist approach. War and 
instability are expensive, and get in the way of good governance and business; therefore by 
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creating a framework that helps to ensure stability, governments are again pursuing their 
individual interests. It simply happens to be the case in a particular instance that such 
stability is in the interests of all the states concerned. Were that not the case, it seems likely 
that such control regimes would quickly collapse. The current trend for America to act 
almost in defiance of the UN in the pursuit of its own interest, for instance by bombing Iraq, 
demonstrates that realist thinking is far from extinct. 
In an attempt to answer such criticisms it has been suggested by that there is currently a 
"bifurcated world order ", where "the inter-state system is juxtaposed with an evolving global 
society in which politics and political space are being rearticulated. "4 
Conclusions 
Having discussed some of the pros and cons of the realist and critical geopolitical accounts, it 
seems that the conception of a bifurcated world order offers the best chance of examining the 
geopolitical situation in the Caspian basin. While an examination of global energy flows 
through the region is becoming more and more relevant, with the increasing penetration of 
outside ideas, capital and technology, the competition amongst neighbouring states to decide 
which one will guide and lead that penetration is one that lends itself well to a neo-realist 
account. Cohen's 1992 model would seem to offer some scope for treating the region as a 
Gateway region, while providing a framework for assessing the relative capability of the 
surrounding states to influence events. Therefore, it would seem appropriate to adopt a 
bifurcated approach in this study also, examining the inter-state activity that is deciding the 
future of the region while acknowledging the effects of some global factors, particularly 
Western interest in the region's economic development, and particularly its oil reserves. 
4 The preceding argument is largely based on Anderson, J, Brook, C & Cochrane, A, (Eds)(1995) A Global 
World?, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 51. 
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Chapter 2 
Clash of Empires: A Geopolitical History of the Region 
This chapter will put the present tangled situation in the Caspian basin in context by briefly 
studying the histories of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and 
the activities of the empires which have surrounded them, Russia/the USSR, Persia/Iran, and 
the Ottoman/Turkish Empire. Their evolution and early existence as more or less 
autonomous states in ancient history wil l be described, as wil l their subsequent absorption by 
their more powerful neighbours. To do this, the histories of the states wil l each be recalled 
individually, covering the period from their birth to the first signs of Russia's expansion into 
the region, amidst the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry of the sixteenth century AD. From that time 
onwards, the history of the Caspian countries becomes considerably intertwined, and 
subsequent events will be described in terms of the activities of the competing empires based 
in Turkey, Iran and Russia. The three southern Caucasus states will be described first. 
The South Caucasus States: Prehistory to 1600AD 
Armenia 
The first of the Caucasus 'states' to emerge was Armenia, in its first incarnation as the 
kingdom of Erubuni, sometime in the eighth century BC, with its capital just outside present 
day Yerevan. However, the Indo-European Armenians are known to have inhabited eastern 
Anatolia from prehistoric days, calling their lands "Hayastan"} For the following 600 years 
or so, subsequent Armenian kingdoms were part of the Persian Empire, until the beginning of 
the first century BC. Then, under the reign of King Tigran I I (95-55BC), the Armenians won 
back their sovereignty with military defeats of Roman, Parthian and Seleucid armies, uniting 
all Armenian-inhabited land in a kingdom which stretched from the Caspian to the 
Mediterranean. Tigran's reign represented the peak of Armenian power;2 after his death, 
Armenia once again became a more or less autonomous region on the border of two empires. 
1 Lang, D M, 1988, The Armenians: A People in Exile, London: Unwin: p.41. 
2 Ibid: p.41. 
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One of the most significant events in the development of the Armenian nation, as opposed to 
the state, was the nation's conversion to Christianity in 30IAD. 3 This made Armenia the 
world's first Christian nation and Armenia's Church developed independently of either of the 
two classical centres of Christianity; Constantinople or Rome. With the reproduction of the 
Bible in a distinctive Armenian script sometime in the f i f th century AD, Armenia's Christian 
heritage has subsequently acted as one of the pillars of a distinct Armenian identity.4 
Unfortunately, a strong Armenian identity did not prove enough to prevent the division of 
Armenia between the Roman and Persian empires in 387AD. That state of affairs continued 
until 640AD, when the Arab Shahs supplanted the Persians, taking over possessions of 
eastern Armenia. For the next 250 years, this left Armenia's rulers with the problem of 
steering their people between the Muslim invaders from the East and absorption by the 
Byzantine empire in the West. In the 9 t h and 10 th centuries AD the Armenian kingdom of Ani 
appeared, located within the present day borders of modern Turkey. However, having failed 
to reach any accommodation with either of its neighbours, in 1045AD Ani fell to Byzantium 
after that empire intrigued to set rival Armenian factions against one another. In 1065, the 
Byzantines were replaced by the Seljuk Turks, who were in turn pushed out by a series of 
Mongol invasions in the 13 th century.5 The ravages of such frequent struggles condemned the 
Caucasian Armenians to a 'dark' age lasting nearly three hundred years. 
While the Caucasian Armenians fell victim to competing empires, another Armenian 
kingdom flourished on the shores of the Mediterranean, in what is now Syrian territory. The 
kingdom of Cicilia was founded in the 11 t h century, and as an ally of the Crusades became the 
main centre for East-West trade in the region.6 However, once again internal struggles left 
the kingdom vulnerable, and successive waves of Seljuk and Mamluk Turkish invasions 
caused the kingdom to disintegrate in the 14 th century. This did not signal the end of 
Armenian prosperity though. Despite the destruction of the Caucasian Armenian nobility by 
harsh taxation and land confiscation by their Mongol rulers from the 13 th to the 16 th centuries, 
when the Safavids of Persia conquered most of Armenia from the Mongols in 1502 a new 
class of Armenian noblemen/traders soon appeared. Granted a monopoly of the Persian silk 
3 Ibid: p.47. 
4 Bremner, I & Taras, R, 1994, Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, New York: Cambridge: 
p.262. 
Lang, D M, 1988, The Armenians: A People in Exile, London: Unwin: p.56. 
6 Ibid: p.6\. 
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trade by the Safavids, the Armenian community flourished, and extended their contacts with 
the emerging Russian Empire. Subsequently, by the end of the 17 th century, the Armenians 
would come to corner the Russian silk market also, starting silk farms along the Terek River 
in the North Caucasus. 
Georgia 
The next of the three states to emerge was Georgian, with the founding of the kingdom of 
Colchis in 600BC. The people of Colchis were Hittite in origin, tribesmen of the Hittite 
empire who had fled eastward to what is now south-western Georgia when the empire was 
destroyed by the Assyrians in 1200BC. Another kingdom that would come to form part of 
Georgia was Iberia (there being no connection with the Spanish Iberia), founded in 300BC 
when other Hittite tribes migrated further eastward over the Surami mountains. The 
kingdoms of Georgia were thoroughly integrated into the Black Sea's trade links; Greek 
colonists set up trading centres along the coast in Batumi, Poti and Sukhumi sometime in the 
7 t h century BC, particularly interested in the produce of the vineyards of Iberia. 
Originally having been influenced by both Zoroastrian and Greek religious influences, the 
kingdom of Iberia converted to Christianity in 330AD. Also at about this time, feudalism 
similar to that in Europe appeared, as did the first recognisably Georgian literary works. 
However, the emergence of feudal governors, and their rivalry with hereditary clan leaders 
would, in the end, fatally weaken subsequent Georgian kingdoms. 
By the sixth century AD, Georgia found itself caught up in the struggle between the 
Byzantine and Persian empires for domination of the southern Caucasus. By 510AD, the 
rulers of the Iberian kingdom, by then also including the areas that were formerly Colchis, 
were so weak that the Iranian empire was able to abolish the Iberian monarchy and exert 
direct control. It was at about this time that the name "Georgia" emerged; from the 
Arabic/Iranian traders' name for the area "Gurjistan ". The Georgians themselves call their 
lands "Sakartvelo". 
A new Georgian kingdom emerged in the 11 t h century, under David the Builder. During his 
rule between 1089 and 1125, David gained the protection of the Byzantine empire for the 
Georgian kingdom, and united the Georgian lands. Under David, the Georgian kingdom 
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expanded to take in areas of modern Armenia, Dagestan, Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, it 
was under David's great-granddaughter Tamar that Georgia truly flowered. Under Tamar, 
Georgian rule extended to Trabzon in what is now Turkey, and Georgian raiders would reach 
Tabriz, in Iran. Georgian culture also flourished, the period seeing great number of Georgian 
literary works. Unfortunately, Georgia's 'golden age' did not last beyond Tamar's reign. 
Eight Mongol invasions in 20 years destroyed much of what had done before, and with the 
collapse of the Byzantine empire in 1453, Georgia found itself isolated from western 
Christendom. Not long after, Georgia fragmented along lines recognisable from its earlier 
history, with 3 smaller kingdoms appearing; one, Imereti, in the west as Colchis had once 
been, and two, Kartli and Khakeli, in the east in what was once Iberia. Five noble families 
also took their chance and set up independent principalities, the principal of these being in 
Mingrelia and Abkhazia, in the west. 
Azerbaijan 
The earliest history of the relatively young country of Azerbaijan is quite vague, but the 
kingdom of Caucasian Albania, of no relation to the Balkan country of that name, is known to 
have existed some time prior to the 4 century AD. Caucasian Albania, or "Arran" as it was 
also known,7 lay along the western shores of the Caspian, extending from Derbent in the 
north to south of the Araxes river. The southern areas of Arran covered the home of the 
Zoroastrian, five-worshipping, religious tradition, and "Azerbaijan" itself means "land of 
fire" after the flammable black oil that bubbled to the earth's surface in that region. The 
original inhabitants of Arran were sedentary Iranian tribes and a variety of mountain people. 
Arran converted to Christianity in the 4 t h century, adopting Armenian Christianity. When 
Arran extended westwards in the 5 t h century, increased contact with the Armenians led to the 
gradual replacement of Albanian script with Armenian, which eventually completely 
supplanted the original writing. At this time, the people of Caucasian Albania enjoyed 
relative autonomy under the Persian Sassanids, who rules by way of vassal states established 
in the area during the 4 t h century. 
7 Swietochowski, T, 1995, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, New York: Columbia: p.l. 
16 
All that was to change in the 7 century when the Arabs invaded the formerly Persian empire. 
The Arabs were much more effective in establishing central rule over the area, installing 
garrisons and local governors, and they set about Islamicising the whole region. Under the 
Arab onslaught, the culture of Caucasian Albania and the creed of Zoroastrianism 
disappeared. 
Three centuries later, however, the Arab dynasties began to crumble, and a wave of Turkic 
invasions and settlement began, supplanting the Arab/Persian identity with a Turkic one. 
However, despite the development of a distinct Turkic Azeri language in the 14 th century, the 
Azerbaijanis took on a distinctly hybrid identity. They adopted Shia Islam, like their Iranian 
neighbours as opposed to the Sunni Turks, in the 15 th century. Also, the Safavid rulers of the 
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region, based in Tabriz, maintained strong Iranian ownership of the area, although they were 
in fact Turkic in origin themselves. Azerbaijan was divided into a number of Khanates under 
the Safavids, ruled either by appointed rulers or acceptable local hereditary chiefs. The most 
important of these were Baku or Shirvan, Shekhi which was known for its silk farms, 
Gyandzha, Derbent, which now lies in Dagestan, and Karabakh, which was much larger than 
its modern equivalent. It was the last years of Safavid rule that saw the flourishing of Azeri 
Turkic as a literary language. 
Even this brief look at the early history of the kingdoms of the south Caucasus readily shows 
how the region has been contested by rival empires ever since there have been empires in the 
region. Romans, Byzantines, Persians, Arabs and Mongols all fought to control the area, in 
the face of opposition from each other and the local people. It seems obvious that the 
physical presence of the Caucasus mountains had much to do with this. I f nothing else, the 
difficulty faced by any outside authority in projecting its power into the mountains would 
seem to militate against the region falling naturally into the orbit of any one empire. 
Therefore competition between rival empires would seem to have been inevitable as their 
relative strengths made it easier or more difficult for them to try to extend their control into 
the mountain areas, where the grip of their rivals was more tenuous than elsewhere. 
Ibid: p.2. 
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The Central Asian States 
The history of the two more obviously 'Central Asian' littoral states, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan wil l now be briefly described. As wil l be seen, both these modern states were 
influenced by a wide variety of cultures prior to Russian Imperial hegemony. However, the 
process perhaps owed less to an imperial desire to control, as exhibited by the Ottomans, 
Persians or Arabs, and more to the 'natural' expansion, contraction and integration of 
different cultures through time, in a region that for much of history has served as the meeting 
place of East and West. 
Kazakhstan 
The Turkic forerunners of the Kazakh people are reputed to have emerged from southern 
Siberia sometime between 600-1200AD, under a legendary chieftain, Alasha Khan. Over the 
next three hundred years, these tribes migrated southward into the great bowl of Central Asia. 
However, soon after these migrations began, early civilisations in the region were devastated 
by Genghis Khan's 'Golden Horde'. Nevertheless, by 1500AD, the Kazakhs were strong 
enough to resist attack from the dominant Central Asian group, the Uzbek confederacy, and 
set up the basis of their own government, three "Ordas" or 'Hordes', as befitting a nomadic 
people very similar to the Mongols. The three hordes, the 'Great Orda' in eastern 
'Turkestan', the 'Middle Orda' of the central steppes and the 'Little Orda' in the west,9 at the 
feet of the Ural mountains, survived until the early seventeenth century, warring amongst 
themselves and facing attacks from the Uzbeks to the south, across the Syrdarya river; from 
the east, by the Dzungarians of north-western China; and from the west, by Kalmyk tribes 
based around the Volga river. It was during this period, around 1500-1600AD, that the 
Kazakhs converted to Islam. 
Finally though, in a period described by the Kazakhs as the 'Great Disaster', the Great Orda 
in the east succumbed to Buddhist Mongolian tribes called the Qirots, being forced to migrate 
westwards and south, while the Russians began expanding into the region from the west and 
north. The Russians built a series of forts extending from Gurev on the north-eastern shore of 
the Caspian, all the way to the Alatau mountains in the east, while at the same time extending 
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their control from Siberia southwards, with forts in Omsk, Semipalatinsk and Orshk by 1735. 
By that time, though, trapped between two advancing enemies, the Kazakh Ordas had been 
forced to accept Russian domination, the three Ordas all signing treaties with the Russians 
between 1731 and 1742, beginning with the Little Orda and ending with the Great. By 1848, 
facing severe restrictions on their nomadic lifestyle, the Kazakhs were forced to accept 
Russian annexation of all their remaining territories. With the exception of repeated revolts 
until 1870, 1848 signalled the end of Kazakh independence until 1991. 1 0 
Turkmenistan 
The areas which now comprises modern Turkmenistan is thought to have been inhabited 
since perhaps 5000BC, its earliest civilisations centring on the fertile oasis to be found 
scattered around the deserts that cover over 80% of the country. From 600BC the area was 
part of the Persian empire, but the area was then conquered by Alexander the Great in 400BC 
as he pushed eastward, defeating the Persians.11 Turkmenistan was then ruled by the Parthian 
kings, Alexander's successors in the East, until 10AD, the kingdom benefiting greatly from 
the Silk Road. Parthian Turkmenistan, based around the great city of Nyssa and a series of 
oasis towns crossing the deserts, flourished until the Middle Ages, which saw the arrival of 
the 'modern' Turkmen peoples from the East in the 10 th and 11 t h centuries AD. 
These Turkmen, feared warriors and raiders, preyed on the caravans of the Silk Road and on 
the settled communities of Persia, Afghanistan and much of Central Asia. These raids 
created a profitable slave trade, which continued until the 19 th century despite frequent 
Persian attempts to stop it. The Turkmens then alternately resisted the Persians or allied 
themselves with them, depending on their relative strengths, until Persia's defeat by the 
Russians in 1813. Russian encroachment into Turkmen territory began with the building of 
forts on the eastern shores of the Caspian in 1834 and continued until all the Turkmen tribes 
had been subdued, in 1886, when the territory was formally annexed. However, the 
campaign to subdue Turkmenistan was a long and brutal one, the Turkmen resisting the 
Russians in the same way as they had previously resisted other invaders. 
9 Ferdinand, P (Ed), The New Central Asia and its Neighbours, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(RIIA): p.9. 
1 0 Bremner, I & Taras, R, 1994, Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, New York: Cambridge: 
p.315. 
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The campaign reached its greatest intensity in 1870, when two great tribal leaders began a 
campaign of attacks on the Russian military expeditions expanding outwards from Russia's 
forts, a guerrilla was that continued until the end of the century. A Russian expedition to take 
the Turkmen fort of Geok Tepe in 1881 ended in disaster for the Russians, an entire army 
being decimated. When they eventually captured the fort, the Russians massacred 6,000 of 
its defenders. Equally brutal was the subjugation of Khiva, traditional centre of the Turkmen 
slave trade, in 1871, which saw the killing of most of the cities inhabitants, men, women and 
children, on the orders of the general leading the expedition. Following this victory, in 1874 
the Russians created a 'TransCaspian' authority, under a General Lomakin, based on the town 
of Krasnovodsk on the eastern shore of the Caspian. The Persian empire quietly acquiesced 
to Russia's suppression of the Turkmen tribes, and Turkmenistan was absorbed into the 
Russian empire in 1886. The brutality of Russia's subjugation of Turkmenistan is a memory 
that still lingers, and modern Turkmenistan's resistance to a close association with the 
Russian-dominated CIS owes much to a now-traditional Turkmen mistrust and hatred of 
Moscow. 
The focus of this discussion wil l now turn back to the Caucasus states and the western side of 
the Caspian, in order to continue the description Great Power expansion and rivalry. Having 
been so effectively absorbed into the Russian empire, and lying beyond the reach of Russia's 
rivals, thanks in part to the effectiveness of Afghanistan and Central Asia's mountains in 
keeping out the British advancing from India, the Central Asian states would not reappear 
until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Modern Great Power Rivalry: 1600AD to 1878 
From the 16 th century onwards, it makes more sense to follow the history of the southern 
Caucasus states from the point of view of the imperial powers. The three states of Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan were all at their weakest, i f they existed at all, from this time 
onwards. Therefore the most reliable information comes from the imperial histories rather 
than local ones. At this stage in its history, the Caucasus was seen as a relatively 
homogeneous area; 'the mountains', the political landscape made up of a motley collection of 
1' Ferdinand, P (Ed), The New Central Asia and its Neighbours, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(RJIA): p.7. 
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khanates and vassal kingdoms, ripe for absorption by the first empire to reach them. This 
was thus the period of the most intense imperial machinations. 
A New Player Takes the Field 
In the mid-sixteenth century a third player appeared in the 'great game' going on between the 
Ottoman and Safavid empires. By this time, in 1555, the Caucasus had been divided along a 
roughly north-south axis, with Azerbaijan firmly under Iranian control. Georgia was divided 
along traditional lines; Khaketi and Kartli in the east under the Iranians, and Western Georgia 
including Mingrelia, Imereti and Abkhazia under Turkish control. Armenia was also de facto 
divided by the two empires, the situation being confirmed in 1639 by the official partition of 
the country with four-fifths going to Turkey and one-fifth to Iran. It was in 1556, under Ivan 
the Terrible, that Russia first appeared in the Caucasus, although to the north of the 
mountains, with the conquest of the Astrakhan khanate on the Caspian coast. The Russians 
then saw the opportunity to develop the Volga-Caspian as a new trade route, and in the late 
1550s an expedition left Astrakhan, crossed the Caspian by boat and travelled inland up the 
Terek river into present day Daghestan, building a fort at Terki. However, no further Russian 
moves took place until nearly 200 years later. 
In 1722, internal struggles left the Safavid empire in a much-weakened state, leaving many of 
its vassals beyond effective central control. Sensing the Safavids' weakness, Russia's Peter 
the Great sent an expedition across the Caspian to Derbent, again in the North Caucasus. 
Having captured Derbent, the Russians then went on to capture Baku Khanate, south of the 
mountains, but were forced to withdraw from both areas with the accession of a more 
powerful Safavid dynasty ten years later. 
Russia's next move had to wait until 1783. Under the Treaty of Georgievsk, King Irakli I I of 
a then united Georgia invited a Russian military presence onto Georgian soil, 1 3 in an effort to 
protect his country from the ravages of Persian-Ottoman warfare and mountain raiders while 
guaranteeing no interference in Georgia's internal affairs. Russia subsequently stationed two 
battalions of its much-feared Cossacks in Georgia, but they were withdrawn only four years 
later during the second Russian-Turkish war, allowing the Persians to sack Tbilisi. In the 
1 2 Swietochowski, T, 1995, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, New York: Columbia: p.2. 
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meantime, Russia's Catherine I I launched an expedition that retook Derbent and Baku. 
Irakli's son Georgi, facing the destruction of his kingdom by internal squabbles and raiders 
agreed to Russia's annexation of Georgia, Tsar Alexander formally annexing the east of the 
country in 1801. 
Russia's Expansion Continues 
At this time, Russia began a sweeping campaign to secure all of the southern Caucasus and a 
strong presence on the Black Sea, simultaneously attacking Turkish and Iranian possessions 
in the area. By about 1810, Turkey's Georgian possessions, Mingrelia, Guria and Abkhazia, 
had been taken under Russian control, although formal and effective annexation had to wait 
another fif ty years, Mingrelia finally being annexed in 1867. Meanwhile, in 1804 the first 
Russian-Persian war began, over control of Azerbaijan. In 1813, after the second period of 
warfare, the Treaty of Gulistan confirmed Russian possession of eastern and western Georgia, 
Daghestan and also the Azerbaijani khanates of Baku, Shirvan, Gyandzha and Karabakh.14 
The treaty also granted Russia the exclusive right to have warships on the Caspian Sea. 
In 1826, the Persians attempted to take back Georgia and the Karabakh. However, they were 
soundly defeated by the Russians and the Treaty of Turkmenchai in 182815 fixed the Iranian-
Russian frontier at its modern position, along the river Araxes, dividing Azerbaijan. Yerevan 
and Nakhichevan khanates were also ceded to Russia, along with an indemnity of 20 million 
roubles from the Persian coffers. Following the Russian annexation of the Karabakh, tens of 
thousands of Armenians emigrated from Persia to the region,1 6 the Armenians already in the 
Karabakh finally believing themselves safe, after appeals to Russia as early as 1789. The 
Turkmenchai treaty essentially ended the period of Russian expansion, but the imperial 
rivalry continued, at least as far as the Ottomans were concerned. 
Never really accepting Russian dominance in the region, the Ottomans spent the next fif ty 
years engaged in constant i f low-level warfare against the Russians, sponsoring uprisings and 
occasionally intervening directly, as occurred in 1855 with the Turkish capture of the 
13 Ibid: p.3. 
14 Ibid: p.5. 
1 5 Known as the Nangin or 'Shameful' Treaty in Iran. Bremner, I & Taras, R, 1994, Nations and Politics in the 
Soviet Successor States, New York: Cambridge: p.229. 
1 6 Lang, D M, 1988, The Armenians: A People in Exile, London: Unwin: p.3. 
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Mingrelian capital Zugdidi. Uprisings involving the Abkhazians and the Mingrelians were 
encouraged, as were revolts in the mountains, in an attempt to take advantage of Russian pre-
occupation with guerrilla campaigns in the north Caucasus. The Russians matched these 
Turkish efforts with moves of their own, the most significant being the encouragement of 
Shia Azerbaijani forces to volunteer to fight against the Sunni Ottomans in the Russian-
Turkish wars. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin finally ended the conflict, ceding possession of 
Batumi, Ardahan and Kars to Russia and requiring the Turks to guarantee the safety of all 
Armenians within their territory.17 
Provinces of Empire 
The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 essentially signalled the end of imperial competition over the 
southern Caucasus, at least until the First World War. Securely within Moscow's orbit, the 
three 'states' were beyond the reach of either the Turks or the Iranians, and a period of 
intensive Russian activity followed, as Moscow tried to create and strengthen the region's 
links with the Russian imperial centre. This activity was by turns repressive and inclusive, 
violent and liberal, often driven by purely military concerns. The northern Caucasus suffered 
most heavily at the hands of the Russian army, during the long-running and bloody revolts 
staged by the mountain peoples, most notably that of the Chechens under Imam Shamil, 
which lasted over thirty years. However, all areas of the Caucasus, whether north or south of 
the mountains, suffered some measure of repression, and in the north this continued for many 
years. In the south however, particularly under the administration of Prince Mikhail 
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Vorontsov, established as viceroy over the area in 1845, Russian policy became increasingly 
liberal, aiming to assimilate rather than suppress. 
Vorontsov's inclusive approach included the creation of local courts and councils, to which 
locals were appointed, and allowing the Georgians to review their own laws and choose 
which ones would be kept in Russian law. Perhaps more significantly he launched a building 
programme, throughout Georgia and Armenia particularly, that saw the construction and 
repair of roads, libraries and high schools, at which Georgian, Armenian and Turkish history 
1 7 The 'guarantees' given in the Treaty of Berlin were actually quite vague. An earlier treaty, the San Stefano 
Treaty, had given much firmer assurances, but the treaty was annulled, never having come into effect, following 
British and European pressure aimed at limiting Russian power in relation to the Ottoman Empire. Lang, D M, 
1988, The Armenians: A People in Exile, London: Unwin: p.4. 
1 8 Swietochowski, T, 1995, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, New York: Columbia: p.l 15. 
23 
were taught. Obviously, these measures had little effect on the great mass of peasantry, but 
they secured the support of the Georgian aristocracy, and also the emerging Georgian and 
Armenian merchant classes. It is obvious however, that Vorontsov himself saw the three 
peoples in different lights, Georgians over Armenians, Armenians over Azerbaijanis. The 
north Caucasians were generally regarded as below contempt and beyond reformation. 
However, despite having achieved the broad support of the ruling elites in the Caucasus, by 
encouraging the formation of local centres of power, and allowing the free development of 
distinctively Georgian, Armenian or Azerbaijani societies, Vorontsov also laid the 
foundations of national feeling among those same elites. In all three societies, local 
intelligentsia began to press for more autonomy within the empire, for civil rights and reform 
of the monarchy. However, just as such feelings began to take hold the assassination of 
Russia's liberal Tsar Alexander I I in 1881 by Russian agitators led to the accession of the 
much less liberal Alexander I I I , who abandoned his father's inclusive programme and 
embarked on a series of repressive campaigns aimed at suppressing the generally socialist 
revolutionary groups beginning to take hold throughout the empire. In the Caucasus, this 
meant the suppression of Armenian culture in particular,19 with the closing of schools and 
churches, but both Georgia and Azerbaijan also suffered their share of agitation and 
suppression. However, the suppression merely served to solidify local feelings of animosity 
toward Moscow, even amongst the previously pro-Russian elites. Although at the time those 
feelings centred around socialism rather than nationalism, the revolutionary movements in the 
three societies had distinct, national characters, which would later lead to the formation of 
three separate states with the fall of the Russian empire after the revolution of 1917. 
The First World War to the Russian Revolution 
It was the onset of the First World War that led to the Caucasian nations' first reappearance in 
the modern world as independent states. However, the process was a painful one, all three of 
the 'new' states of their constituent peoples suffering at the hands of one or other of the two 
sides in the war, particularly the Russians and Turks. Much of the subsequent animosity 
between the three peoples was laid in this period, as were their perceptions of their more 
powerful neighbours. 
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Proxy war and Ethnic Atrocities 
When war broke out, the peoples of the southern Caucasus found themselves under pressure 
from the outside, the region lying between the opposing powers of Russia and Turkey. Both 
of these imperial powers involved the Caucasian peoples in the wider conflict, encouraging 
their smaller 'allies' to fight as proxies. This in turn led the opposing power to persecute any 
of the 'opposing' peoples within their reach. For instance, Georgian Muslim participation in 
a failed Turkish raid on the Russian-held port of Batumi led to the Russians massacring 
45,000 of the 52,000 inhabitants of the Chorokhi valley in south-western Georgia. But the 
fate of the Armenians was by far the worst horror inflicted on any of the Caucasian peoples, 
at any time in their history. The Caucasian Armenians were strongly pro-Russian, and trusted 
enough to form their own 'volunteer' battalions in the Russian army. Alongside Russian-
sponsored Armenian Dashnak (radical nationalist) guerrilla activity in Turkish territory,2 0 this 
led the Turks to suspect the reliability of the Armenian people as a whole. As a result, in 
1915 the Ottoman empire set about the attempted genocide of the Turkish Armenians, who 
were concentrated in their 'historic homeland' of eastern Anatolia. 
Throughout the winter and spring of 1915-16, 'Turkish Armenian' soldiers and intellectuals 
were systematically executed.21 And then, having killed their leaders, the Turks began their 
campaign against the mass of the Armenian population. Given no warning, the Armenians 
were told to march immediately for new settlements supposedly waiting for them near the 
Syrian border. With no food or water, and prevented from selling their property to get money, 
the Armenians were then marched south through near-desert conditions. Killed by the Turks 
themselves, or Kurdish guerrillas, or bandits, or simply by thirst, between 1 and 1.5 million 
Armenians died, essentially eliminating them from Turkish territory, and leaving their 
homelands ravaged and deserted. 
Leaving only 700,000 Armenians in the impoverished Russian Caucasus, mainly in Yerevan 
province, and an unknown number scattered throughout the world as the Armenian diaspora, 
it is hardly surprising that "the holocaust was to become the ruling factor in Armenian 
1 9 Lang, D M, 1988, The Armenians: A People in Exile, London: Unwin: p.7. Also Goldenberg, S, 1994, Pride 
of Small Nations, London: Zed Books. 
2 0 And despite the presence of thousands of'loyal' Armenians in the Ottoman Turkish Army. Lang, D M, 1988, 
The Armenians: A People in Exile, London: Unwin: p.22. 
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political life in the Caucasus...and in the diaspora beyond". No study of the geopolitics of 
the southern Caucasus is complete without a description of the Armenian holocaust and the 
subsequent diaspora. The event was a landmark in the formation of the modern Armenian 
culture and has heavily influenced subsequent Armenian activity, both in the Caucasus and 
abroad. 
A Short-lived Caucasian Republic 
Returning to events in the wider context, 1917 and the Russian Revolution signalled the 
advent of Caucasian independence, with the formation of a provisional Kadet (Constitutional 
Democrat) government in Moscow. The Mensheviks were firmly established in each of the 
Caucasian republics, except in the city of Baku, which was under the control of the local 
Bolsheviks. Despite this apparent political solidarity, the Armenian Dashnaks, Azerbaijani 
Musavists and Georgian Social Democrats seem first and foremost to have been national 
movements. Nevertheless, by the end of 1917 the local Mensheviks had formed a provisional 
Caucasian government, and immediately afterwards, the Russian army withdrew from the 
area. 
The fledgling government suffered a severe blow only three months into its existence. In 
March 1918, Russia's Bolsheviks signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty, ending Russian 
involvement in the First World War. Under the agreement, the Bolsheviks ceded the 
Georgian towns of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi to Turkey, along with the Armenian-populated 
Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki districts. Meanwhile, tension between the Baku Bolsheviks and 
the Azerbaijani Musavists finally erupted into violence, and when Armenian Dashnaks living 
in the city joined in on the Bolshevik side, the fighting became a pogrom against the 
Azerbaijanis, leaving 30,000 dead. The following month, the Trans-Caucasian government 
declared independence, under pressure from Turkey to do so, in exchange for diplomatic 
recognition and perhaps peace. Supported by Azerbaijan's Musavists, who had no fear of the 
Turks, but not by the Armenian Dashnaks or the Georgian Social Democrats, the Democratic 
Federative Republic of Transcaucasia lasted only five weeks. In spite of her promises, 
2 1 Lang, D M, 1988, The Armenians: A People in Exile, London: Unwin: p.28. 
Also Goldenberg, S, 1994, Pride of Small Nations, London: Zed Books. 
2 2 Goldenberg, S, 1994, Pride of Small Nations, London: Zed Books. 
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Turkey sent her troops into Kars and Batumi and invaded Yerevan province, in a drive to 
Baku that was welcomed by Georgia's Muslims. 
Three 'New' States 
Under such pressure, the Transcaucasian government collapsed. Georgia declared 
independence on 26 May, 2 3 pinning its hopes of survival on a deal with Germany, by which 
Georgia would be protected in exchange for German use of her ports and railways. The 
following day Azerbaijan followed suit, and on 29 May a terribly weak Armenia did likewise. 
Turkey kept up its pressure on the two new Christian states though, forcing Georgia to give 
up Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe in exchange for Ottoman recognition, and also gaining 
Nakhichevan from Armenia. Facing the prospect of a Turkish attack, the Baku soviet also 
collapsed, its leaders trying to flee but being arrested. The new Armenian and Russian 
authorities in Baku then asked the British to intervene, to protect them from the Ottomans. 
On 17 August, Britain's General Dunsterville arrived with 1,000 men. Within a month, 
facing a vastly greater Turkish force, he had withdrawn again, leaving the Turks to occupy 
Baku on 15 September. 10,000 died in the anti-Armenian backlash that followed. 2 4 
Perhaps fortunately, the Turkish occupation of Baku and much of the southern Caucasus did 
not last long. In October of 1918, Germany and Turkey sued for peace, and both withdrew 
their forces from the Caucasus. The resulting power vacuum was then filled by the return of 
•ye 
the British to Baku, at the request of Azerbaijan's Musavist government. Britain's return 
was prompted by a desire to seize the Baku oil industry for the Entente and to pressure the 
new Bolshevik government in Russia by cutting off vital resource. The Transcaucasus would 
also serve as a buffer zone to restrict any Russian expansion towards Britain's interests in 
Persia. This time though, the British did not confine themselves to Baku, also occupying the 
Georgian port of Batumi and the oil terminal there, amidst intense suspicion on both sides. 
The Armenians, hoping that the British presence meant that their pleas for international 
recognition and protection would be heard, were delighted. 
Swietochowski, T, 1995, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, New York: Columbia: p.67. 
2 4 Lang, D M, 1988, The Armenians: A People in Exile, London: Unwin: p.36. 
Swietochowski, T, 1995, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, New York: Columbia: p.73. 
2 5 Swietochowski, T, 1995, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, New York: Columbia: p.75. 
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Relations between the three Caucasian states did not improve with the arrival of the British; 
in fact, they worsened. Almost as soon as the British had arrived, Armenian Dashnaks, 
seeking to restore something of the Armenian 'historic homelands' attacked the Armenian-
inhabited districts of Georgia, and also made an attempt on Tbilisi itself. When they failed, 
the Georgians took reprisals against the Armenian population. Meanwhile, in Nagornyy 
Karabakh, Armenian peasants and Azerbaijani herdsmen were constantly skirmishing. In 
1919, the Armenians sought to ease their vulnerability by allying themselves with the White 
Russian army in the region, led by General Denikin. Denikin's army was at that time much 
stronger than the Red forces in the region, and seemed to provide a fair guarantee of safety 
for the Armenians, but as an old-guard colonial officer, his forces posed a major threat to both 
Azerbaijan and Georgia; this did nothing to ease inter-ethnic tension. Meanwhile, the three 
states' efforts to introduce some semblance of liberal democracy were totally undermined by 
ethnic chauvinism, preventing their recognition by the League of Nations. In August of 
1919, Britain withdrew its forces from Azerbaijan,26 possibly anticipating a Bolshevik victory 
in the Russian Civil War. 
Eight months after the British withdrawal, the 70,000 strong 11 t h Red Army defeated 
Denikin, the Cossacks and Caucasian mountaineers, and Azerbaijan found itself facing the 
prospect of an invasion from the north while its troops were busy fighting the Armenians of 
the Nagornyy Karabakh, in the west. Left with no other option, Azerbaijan's Musavists 
ceded power to the Bolsheviks, ending Azerbaijan's brief experience of independence in 
April 1920.27 In May, with the British force in Batumi about to leave, Georgia was forced to 
sign a 'friendship' treaty with the Bolshevik government, which guaranteed Georgia's 
independence in exchange for Bolshevik freedom of movement in the country. It made little 
difference; the same month, Bolsheviks seized Tbilisi's military academy, supported by an 
Ossetain attack from the north. Though the attack was defeated, leaving 5,000 Ossetians 
dead, Georgia was left teetering on the brink of surrender. In September, the Turkish army 
took Kars, and the Dashnaks were forced to accept a treaty giving up Armenian rights to their 
'historic homelands'. Once again though, the Turks were forced to give up their gains when 
the Red Army invaded Yerevan province in November and annexed it to Russia. Georgia 
lasted only another three months before it too was annexed, in February 1921. In October, 
Swietochowski, T, 1995, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, New York: Columbia: p.81. 
Also Goldenberg, S, 1994, Pride of Small Nations, London: Zed Books. 
2 7 Swietochowski, T, 1995, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, New York: Columbia: p.94. 
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Kars and Ardahan were once again signed away to Turkey, who also insisted that Adzharia 
and Nakhichevan provinces be granted the status of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics 
(ASSRs). Adzharia therefore became the only ASSR to be granted its status on the basis of 
religion, as 90% of its population were Muslims, Turkey's prime concern in its insistence on 
the region's 'autonomy'. Nakhichevan's status, on the other hand, was a result of lingering 
Turkish ambition toward the Caucasus. Nakhichevan gave Turkey a short but strategically 
and politically important border with the Azerbaijanis. 
Soviet Rule 
The Transcaucasus finally having been secured, the Bolsheviks set about reorganising the 
region's administration. Despite protestations from an increasingly i l l Lenin, the three 
nations were once again united in December 1922 in the Trans-Caucasian Federated Soviet 
Socialist Republic, under the administration of the Caucasian bureau, 'Kavburo', of the 
Central Committee. It was the Kavburo that set the internal borders between the republics of 
the region. In 1923, unwittingly laying the foundations for the disputes of the future, the 
Kavburo granted Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan and Nagornyy Karabakh to Armenia, despite 
both being surrounded by the territories of the other republic. 
There then followed a thirty-year period of anti-Islamic campaigns, Russification and 
Stalinist purges. Although Stalin's purges most drastically affected the north Caucasus 
peoples, particularly the Chechens, Balkars and Ingush, all the peoples of the southern 
Caucasus suffered badly, the elites of all three nationalities being almost obliterated. The 
worst fate, however, befell the Meshketian Turks. Probably fearing Turkish attempts to 
destabilise Russia's south, through the Turkic peoples living there, Stalin deported 100,000 
Meshketian Turks from Georgia. Unlike the north Caucasians, who were eventually 
'rehabilitated' in the 1950s under Kruschev, the Meshketian Turks were never allowed to 
return. 
In 1953, Khrushchev took over Soviet rule after Stalin's death. He found that the purges had 
almost destroyed the regional parties, and that there was an urgent need to replenish the 
numbers of party members among the 'nationalities'. He therefore began to reimpose Lenin's 
programme of integration of the nationalities, korenizatsia. 
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Korenizatsia: Storing Up Trouble 
Korenizatsia, "indigenisation", had been Lenin's brainchild, a programme to integrate the 
minority nationalities into the Party in an attempt to gain their support for the Revolution. 
Although never applied evenly throughout the Soviet Union, Korenizatsia "contributed to 
one of the most important, and least understood, legacies of Soviet rule in the Caucasus - the 
way in which it helped to instil a separate ethnic consciousness ...The structure of the Soviet 
Union, which for the first time linked ethnicity, territory and administration, inherently 
strengthened national identity."2* This applied particularly to the Muslim nations and 
especially the Azerbaijanis, who for the first time were called 'Azerbaijani' rather than 
'Turks' or 'Muslims'. 2 9 Korenizatsia also encouraged the use of local languages and culture 
in the various republics. When first applied, this had seen a flowering of literature 
throughout the Union, but particularly in Georgia and Armenia. An Arabic script for 
common use by the diverse north Caucasian populations was even introduced, although it 
was forcibly reconverted to Cyrillic script later on. And in 1938, despite Stalin's campaign of 
Russification, Georgia and Armenian were designated sole official languages in their 
republics. The Azerbaijani language, although eventually receiving the same recognition had 
to wait until the less suspicious times of 1956. Under Khrushchev, a massive bureaucracy 
was created to ensure the success of korenizatsia in the republics. Local literature was 
encouraged, as were all the various art forms, and local universities were opened. 
Meanwhile, the proportion of locals in the regional party structure was increased. The 
combination of these processes eventually resulted in Georgians becoming the best-educated 
nationality in the USSR, followed by the Armenians, while the Azerbaijanis were the best 
educated of the Muslim peoples. 
Unfortunately, korenizatsia also created a problematic legacy for the successor republics. 
The process did increase the number of local nationalities in the republic elites, but 
unfortunately, the local apparatus' soon became extended family affairs, which encouraged 
ethnic chauvinism and exclusion, and corruption. It seems likely that it was a sense of 
exclusion that led to the heightening of Armenian grievances in Nagornyy Karabakh. 
Korenizatsia also led to a covert nationalism among the republics, that would come to 
challenge central Soviet authority, particularly in the 1970s. Both Georgia's Eduard 
2 8 Goldenberg, S, 1994, Pride of Small Nations, London: Zed Books. 
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Shevardnadze and Azerbaijan's Heydar Aliyev made their careers on the back of fighting 
nationalist activity and corruption in their respective republics, and were installed as leaders 
after independence in a wave of nostalgia for the stability of those years.30 It is unfortunate 
that a policy intended to include as many of the minority nations as possible in the structures 
of the Soviet Union also laid the foundations for conflict between those peoples. While the 
Soviet state existed it was able to control and suppress ethnic or national differences between 
and within its constituent republics. But when that over-arching authority was weakened, and 
eventually removed, the various nations' strong ties with particular territories, combined with 
a legacy of animosity generated in part by the ethnic chauvinism of the local party elites, led 
inevitably to conflict. This was particularly true in the Caucasus, where the somewhat 
arbitrary decisions of the Kavburo and succeeding authorities had left a patchwork of 
overlapping claims, that did not necessarily fi t the complex ethnic situation on the ground. 
Having given what was by necessity a brief, 'broad-brush', and admittedly quite realist and 
imperialist account of the early history of the Caspian region, it now becomes possible to 
move on to the current disputes in the region over the legal status of the Caspian Sea itself, 
and the possession and exportation of the region's extensive oil and gas reserves. It is 
intended that an awareness of the historical context in which the various parties are acting 
should allow a more sensitive appraisal of the motivations behind the actions of the various 
states involved. While it is true that times have changes in the Caspian region as they have 
everywhere else, in trying to come to terms with their new, unlooked-for independence the 
governments of the newly-independent states have often called upon their countries' history 
in their attempts to bind their populations together. Consequently, historical enmities and 
alliances have been rediscovered and continue to influence the decisions of the fledgling 
governments. The most obvious case in point is the post-Soviet resurgence of conflict 
between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, although this is not the only such example. In the 
same way, historical factors have been significant in shaping the wider modern rivalries in the 
region, and the roles which outside powers like Russia, Iran, Turkey and the US have come to 
assume. 
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Chapter 3 
Dividing the Spoils: Sovereignty in the Caspian Sea 
Introduction 
Covering an area roughly the same size as Japan at 370,000sq.km\ and possessing a unique 
environment, the Caspian lies in one of the most geopolitically sensitive regions in the world. 
With Russia to the north, Iran and the Persian Gulf to the south, the Caucasus to the west and 
the newly-independent states of Central Asia to the east, control over the Caspian or freedom 
of navigation upon it would represent a significant strategic objective in itself. (See Figures 2 
and 3, pages 33 and 35) Add potential recoverable hydrocarbon reserved of perhaps 10 
billion tonnes of oil and 5 trillion cu.m of gas2 and the Caspian and its seabed becomes very 
important indeed to the five littoral states and a number of regional and global players. But 
how do these five disparate states set about managing what one author has described as their 
"common heritage "?3 By looking at what is at stake for the parties, we begin to see why the 
controversy surrounding sovereignty over the Caspian has become so complex and generated 
so much confrontation. 
What's At Stake? Strategic, Political and Economic Implication 
As already mentioned, control of the Caspian space is in itself a desirable strategic objective, 
particularly for Russia, which regards the Caspian region as part of its 'legitimate sphere of 
interest' and an important section of the 'southern rim', its bulwark against outside influences 
from the Middle East and South Asia. The strategic equation is also significantly influenced 
by the presence of major hydrocarbon deposits. A l l of the littoral states desperately need the 
resources and potential revenues the Caspian holds. 
' Pratt, M & Schofield, C (1995) 'When is a Sea not Sea? International Boundaries, Resources and 
Environmental Security in the Caspian Sea', International Boundaries and Environment Security, Singapore 
University, 14-18 June. 
2 Vinogradov, S (1996) 'The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and its Hydrocarbon Resources', Boundaries and 
Energy: Problems and Prospects, Durham University, 18-19 July. 
3 Bundy R, (1995) Background Paper for the Meeting of Experts on Environmental Co-operation in the Caspian 
Region: Legal Framework and Institutional Mechanism, UNEP - ROE / CASP.LG / Background Document, 
December, as cited in: Vinogradov, S (1996) 'The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and its Hydrocarbon 
Resources', Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospects, Durham University, 18-19 July. 
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Figure 2 
The Caucasian States and the Caspian 
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Russia needs them to help maintain its economic reforms and growth; the 'new' states of 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan need them for the increased economic and hence 
political independence oil revenues would bring; and Iran needs them to ease the economic 
and political pressures it faces as a result of the US-led embargo on trade and investment with 
Tehran. The potential impact of oil revenues on the region is made clear by a quote from 
Kazakhstan's Deputy Foreign Minister Gizzatov: 
"For Kazakhstan, exploration of the Caspian mineral resources will determine how quickly 
the country will be able to stand on its feet. "4 
Coupled with this, the Caspian region has attracted a disproportionately high level of interest 
and investment from international oil companies operating in the former Soviet Union. 
Indeed, even though the Caspian region accounts for only 14% of the known oil reserves of 
the former Soviet Union, 84 (37%) of the 225 upstream (i.e. drilling and production) 
hydrocarbon development projects in the former Soviet Union currently under discussion or 
development are devoted to the region.5 There are three main reasons for this, which 
combine to make the Caspian uniquely attractive to outside investment. Firstly, there is the 
perception that the Caspian has the potential to provide great rewards in the future. Secondly, 
this potentially huge resource is located in what might be described as 'Europe's hinterland', 
within reach of a huge import-dependent energy market, current difficulties over export 
routes notwithstanding. Finally, many corporations have found it difficult to do business in 
Russia, and are attracted by the enthusiasm with which they have been courted by the newly 
independent states in the region. 
The political and economic implications of any dispute over the Caspian would also resonate 
beyond the coastal states. Georgia, for example, is looking to benefit from the transit fees 
and foreign investment the southern 'twin track' pipeline will bring. Turkey, meanwhile, is 
also pushing for a major pipeline to carry Caspian oil across its territory, for much the same 
reason. Also, Ankara would much rather see Caspian oil piped across its territory than 
sailing through the Bosporous aboard tankers that it sees as a significant environmental risk. 
4 Pratt, M & Schofield, S (1996) 'Claims to the Caspian Sea'. Jane's Intelligence Review, 8,2. 
5 Seek, A (1996) 'Pipelines from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus: A Maze of Alternatives', Boundaries and 
Energy: Problems and Prospects, Durham University, 17-18 July. 
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Figure 3 
The Central Asian States and the Caspian 
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Also, as the nearest, working free-market economy, Turkey would be in an excellent position 
to benefit from the political and economic revival of these countries, which in the short- to 
medium-term wil l be driven almost exclusively by Caspian oil. Looking even further afield, 
international consortia have invested heavily in the region and risk huge losses should the 
Caspian not, in the end, deliver what it promises. These economic interests have therefore 
generated political interests, particularly in the US, UK and France as they seek to maintain 
free and secure access to the region for their companies' capital. 
A l l of these issues, pipeline routes, investment, strategic considerations, are outlined in other 
chapters, but at the heart of dispute lies the issue of the future legal status of the Caspian Sea 
itself. Really effective management and exploitation of the Caspian" living and non-living 
resources, and protection of the Caspian's unique environment, not least the Beluga sturgeon, 
wil l be impossible without a strong legal regime based on a consensus of all five littoral 
states. While the unilateral moves made up to now have allowed some development to go 
ahead and made it easier to assess the potential rewards of further investment, long-term 
progress will depend on the littoral states' ability to reach an agreement on how the Caspian's 
resources should be divided or managed, and under what sort of legal regime. 
The crux of the problem lies in differing interpretations of the Caspian's current legal status 
and what sort of status it should have in future. To examine the current situation, it is 
necessary to look at the legal regime applied to the Caspian prior to the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. 
Previous Treaties 
The first treaty of relevance to an examination of sovereignty over the Caspian Sea is the 
Treaty of Turkmenchai of 10 February, 1828, between Russia and Persia.6 Signed following 
Russia's defeat of the Persian Empire in one of a number of wars, the Treaty defined the land 
boundary between the two entities. However, Article IV stated that the boundary ended on 
the shores of the Caspian. This strongly suggests that the Caspian was not delimited at that 
time. Article V I I I of the Treaty, meanwhile, gave Russia the exclusive right to maintain 
warships on the Caspian. 
6 British and Foreign State Papers XV: 669. 
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The treaty of 1828 was then effectively superseded by the Treaty of Friendship signed by the 
new USSR and Persia in 16 February, 1921.7 Article I I I of this Treaty recommended the 
creation of a joint commission to look at the frontier, although again there was no specific 
mention of the Caspian. Meanwhile, Article IX of the Treaty revoked Article VI I I of the 
Turkmenchai agreement and established complete freedom of navigation for all types of ships 
belonging to either side. Little else was said about the two States' sovereign rights in the 
Caspian. 
The first mention of national zones of any kind in the Caspian was made in the Soviet and 
Iranian Treaty of 27 August, 1935.8 While Article XIV once again reiterated both sides' 
rights to freedom of navigation, Article XV established 10-mile fishing zones exclusive to 
both sides, although yet again no formal boundary was described. Perhaps more significantly 
for the sovereignty issue, an Exchange of Letters accompanying the Treaty described the 
Caspian as a "Soviet and Iranian sea". The rights set out in the 1935 Treaty were then 
confirmed in a Treaty of 25 March 1940. This represented the last element in the Soviet-era 
legal regime governing the Caspian, and applied up until the dissolution of the USSR in 
1991. 
To recap, prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, the two littoral states Russia/USSR and 
Persia/Iran had at no point explicitly described the extent of their sovereign rights over the 
Caspian Sea, except to define national 10-mile fishing zones in the treaties of 1935 and 1940. 
The closest the two sides came to any definition of the status of the Caspian as a whole was 
to describe it as a "Soviet and Iranian Sea " in an Exchange of Letters, and while this could 
be interpreted as a description of some form of joint sovereignty, it may also be interpreted as 
simply an expression of the two sides' legitimate interests, with no implications for the sea's 
status overall. Currently, only Russia has explicitly stated that it regards these treaties as 
constituting the current, post-Soviet legal regime of the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan in particular have questioned the continuing validity of the early treaties in the 
light of the appearance of three new littoral states. Kazakhstan's Deputy Foreign Minister 
Gizzatov described Russian claims that these treaties support arguments for joint sovereignty 
over the Caspian as "spurious"9 
7 League of Nations — Treaty Series, 1921: 401 -413. 
8 League of Nations - Treaty Series, 1935: 301-331. 
9 Pratt, M & Schofield, S (1996) 'Claims to the Caspian Sea', Jane's Intelligence Review, 8,2. 
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Having described the legal situation as it stood immediately prior to the emergence of the 
three new littoral states, the negotiating positions of the five parties wi l l now be described, 
and the thinking behind them examined to assess their validity or otherwise. 
National Positions 
Russia 
Russia has adopted perhaps the most unusual position regarding its proposals for the 
Caspian's future legal status. Moscow has called for a regime of condominium over the sea, 
the five littoral states exercising joint sovereignty over its surface and seabed and jointly 
managing and exploiting its living and non-living resources. This is made clear by a 
declaration from Russia's President Yeltsin in May 1995: "The Caspian is a special inner sea 
and it cannot be divided... This concerns oil and gas as well. "10 
The Russian position is based on a number of fairly uncomplicated arguments. Firstly, the 
'existing' legal regime of the Caspian, based on the pre-1991 Soviet-Iranian treaties, 
effectively described the Caspian as some sort of 'strategic unity'. The two sides never 
divided the Caspian, and the reference to a "Soviet and Iranian Sea " demonstrates that both 
sides regarded themselves as having equal rights over it. Secondly, any and all development 
of the Caspian's resources up to 1991, certainly in the Soviet sector, was undertaken primarily 
by the Russians on behalf of the whole Soviet Union, and Russia has thus earned a stake in 
future developments. To quote Russian Fuel and Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik in 
November 1994; 
"Russia must have...access to the resources of the Commonwealth of Independent States. We, 
by virtue of our labour, mind, energy, have created all this... "" 
Russia has explicitly stated that "unilateral action is respect of the Caspian Sea is unlawful, " 
and it has "reserved the right to take such measures as it deems necessary...to restore the 
legal order and overcome the consequences of unilateral actions, " warning that these 
1U Ibid 
nlbid. 
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measures might result in "major material damage " n Despite this quite uncompromising 
stance, Russia has accepted that the five parties would all be entitled to jurisdiction over 
maritime areas adjacent to their coasts, within certain limits agreed by all the parties. 
The Geopolitics Behind Russia's Position 
There are a wide range of factors apparently influencing Russia's position, including 
economic imperatives, security concerns, and the interaction between domestic and foreign 
politics. 
The most easily discerned of these influences is the simple fact that, i f the Caspian were to be 
partitioned, Russia would be left with almost no significant oil deposits (see Table 1 below). 
Most of the commercially attractive offshore deposits lie in the southern half of the Caspian, 
in Azerbaijani and Turkmen waters; Russia would see none of the profits from these fields in 
the event of the Caspian being wholly divided between the littoral states. Conversely, and 
even more frustratingly, it would see its former 'subjects' reap the rewards of what Russia 
sees as its own earlier efforts to develop the Caspian reserves, during Soviet times. A 
condominium regime is the only way Russia is going to see any return on its Soviet-era 
investment. Softening this position slightly, i f Russia could persuade the other littoral states 
to agree to 45nm national zones and a common Caspian centre, it would gain possession of 
almost as much oil as under a complete joint sovereignty arrangement, while apparently 
compromising over the other states' demands for their sovereign rights. 
Table 1: Possible Distribution of Hydrocarbon Resources 
Sectoral 
Delimitation 
25nm National 
Zone 
12nm National 
Zone 
State Oil (bMT)/ 
Gas (tCM) 
Oil (bMT)/ 
Gas (tCM) 
Oil (bMT)/ 
Gas (tCM) 
Russia 1.0 /1.0 1.0 /0.5 0.2/0.3 
Kazakhstan 3.0/1.5 2.0 /1.0 0.6 / 0.4 
Azerbaijan 2.5/1.5 1.5/1.5 0.5/0.5 
Turkmenistan 0.5/1.0 0.5/0.5 0.1 /0.2 
Shared Zone 2.0/1.5 5.6/3.6 
Total 7.0 / 5.0 7.0 / 5.0 7.0 / 5.0 
1 2 Russian Memorandum to the UN, 5 October, 1994, as cited in Pratt, M & Schofield, S (1996) 'Claims to the 
Caspian Sea', Jane's Intelligence Review, 8,2. 
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Russia, despite the vast natural resources distributed throughout its territories, particularly in 
the north, desperately needs the easily exploited hydrocarbons of the Caspian, primarily for 
the potential hard-currency earning they represent. As stated earlier, the Caspian, with its 
proven reserves and proximity to both established and emerging energy markets, had 
attracted a disproportionate share of the foreign investment currently being made in the 
former Soviet Union's hydrocarbon deposits, wherever they are. The Caspian deposits 
therefore represent a good short- to medium-term source of hard-currency earnings, which 
the Russians can invest in their long-term future. 
Connected with this is the Russian perception that issues such as this represent a 'zero-sum' 
situation; that either they or the Newly-Independent States can benefit from such resources, 
but not both. Therefore, the greater share of such resources they can keep for themselves, the 
more it benefits them and harms their 'competitors' among the NIS. Many in Russia have yet 
to truly come to terms with the fact of the NIS' independence, and there seems to be a 
perception that the Russians must make every effort to maintain those states' dependence on 
Moscow, or Russia will lose all the influence and security it once had. Therefore, keeping 
those states, such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine in particular, very closely connected with 
Russia by whatever means possible is currently seen by many as the only way to secure 
Russia's position. 
The mention of the Ukraine in the previous sentence is intended to highlight the wider 
implications of the Caspian issue. I f Moscow can retain effective control of the energy 
resources available to the former Soviet Union, it wil l retain much of its influence over the 
rest of the former Soviet States. Preventing the diversification of energy supply to other 
former Soviet states, by preventing the development of independent, alternative suppliers 
such as Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan hope to become, would restrict the capacity of those states 
for independent action that might conflict with Moscow's strategic aims. Also, in Moscow's 
eyes, restricting such competition makes good commercial sense; i f it had competition it 
would no longer be in a position to fix oil and gas prices to its neighbours at a level 
advantageous to itself. 
Another factor in Russia's efforts to retain a stake in the Caspian's resources is again linked 
to this now traditional Russian 'obsession' with security, understandable enough considering 
Russia's suffering at the hands of a number of different invaders. One of the stated priorities 
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in the maintenance of Russian security is the securing of 'strategic minerals' important to the 
maintenance of Russia's economic development. Hydrocarbons obviously figure among 
those minerals. Russia has therefore given notice that it will make every effort to secure for 
itself access to as much of these minerals as it could, wherever they were located in the 
former Soviet Union. 
There is a further foreign policy aspect to Russia's demands for joint sovereignty over the 
Caspian, that has less to do with Russia gaining any material advantage but more to do with 
restricting the freedom of its former subjects. It is widely accepted that one of the immediate 
consequences of the development of Caspian oil by the former Soviet littoral states would be 
their increased independence from Moscow, even i f not to the extent that they could act 
completely in defiance of the Kremlin. As discussed above, such independence would be 
unacceptable to many of Russia's decision-makers. Consequently, it is in those men's 
interests i f those states are not allowed to develop their Caspian oil deposits unchecked, as 
this would maintain their current close ties to Moscow, and maintain Russia's influence in its 
'near abroad'. One way to achieve this is to make long-term development of the Caspian 
reserves too risky to be attractive to potential investors. While it has been impossible to 
prevent the current crop of short-term 'early oi l ' deals, doubts over the eventual 'ownership' 
of the Caspian oil reserves might well be enough to prevent their long-term, and much more 
significant, development. So while Russia maintains its opposition to partition of the Caspian 
and its resources, it is effectively preventing the other littoral states from increasing their 
independence, and so maintaining its own pre-eminent position. 
Also, Russia, by virtue of its position in the existing pipeline routes between the Caspian and 
the West, is able to pursue a 'Twin Track' diplomatic policy toward the former Soviet littoral 
states. Russia essentially has two holds on the littoral states; the sovereignty issue, and the 
pipeline issue, as wi l l be discussed later. While this wil l be discussed more fully following a 
description of the competition over oil pipeline routes in the next chapter, suffice it to say that 
Russia is able to use the sovereignty issue as a lever in its negotiations over the route of any 
pipelines. It can effectively deny the bulk of the oil to the other littoral states in the first 
place, and continue to do so until it gets its way over the pipeline routes. Similarly, i f its 
position in the sovereignty row is threatened, it can likewise threaten to make trouble over the 
pipelines. This has granted the Russians a very strong negotiating position, which wil l 
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probably have to be recognised by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, with 
concessions to Moscow, before they can hope to develop their reserves. 
Another factor behind Russia's somewhat adversarial position is the strong desire, and in fact 
need, of the Russian government to be taken seriously as a world power. The loss of its role 
as an 'imperial' power (whatever the Soviet Union was supposed to be, it is now widely 
recognised that it was little more than a Russian empire) has had a profound effect on the 
confidence of the Russian people, and its government. Moscow's constant meddling in the 
affairs of the former Soviet states possibly owes as much to the Russian government's need to 
be seen to have retained its power, as to any objectives of realpolitik. This desire on the part 
of the government has only been increased by generally similar sentiments on the part of the 
Russian populace; any government seen to be backing down over affairs in the former Soviet 
Union would be deeply unpopular, and while Russia is perhaps not yet completely 
democratic, the Kremlin can no longer ignore the wil l of the population. 
This domestically prompted move to retain at least some of its old imperial powers on the 
territory of the fSU has been reinforced by a foreign policy objective. It is very much in 
Russia's interests to prevent any of its neighbours, particularly Turkey, Iran and China 
making a move to take over from Russia as the pre-eminent power in Central Asia. By 
adopting a 'Monrovski Doctrine' (the name, at least, is inspired by America's Monroe 
Doctrine of the 19 th and 20 t h centuries) the Kremlin has more or less explicitly made it clear 
that it wil l not tolerate outside 'interference' in what it continues to see as its 'back yard'. In 
this way, the Russians may hope to forestall any moves by its rivals until it has recovered 
more of its economic, political and military strength. Consequently, the Russian government 
has been forced, though perhaps not always unwillingly, to 'act tough' in its dealings with the 
former Soviet states, when a more liberal approach might have served Russia's long-term 
interests better. The sovereignty dispute might be a case in point. 
Against this background, it is interesting to note the recent US involvement in a 
'peacekeeping' exercise in Kazakhstan. In a rather unsubtle demonstration of America's truly 
global military reach, the 'Centrazbat '97' exercises saw 500 US paratroopers parachute into 
Kazakhstan after flying directly, non-stop from their base in America, a flight of some 
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13,000km. Although it was denied that this was meant to be a message, it seems clear that 
the jump was meant to reassure the Central Asian states that American help isn't actually far 
away, while simultaneously reminding Russia that this part of its 'sphere of influence' is not 
beyond American influence either.14 
By maintaining its insistence on some form of condominium, clearly unacceptable to 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Russia has perhaps needlessly delayed progress in a project that 
would have benefited the whole Caspian region. The Russian Energy Ministry has applied 
consistent and succesful pressure to ensure Russian inclusion in the various oil production 
consortia. However, the Foreign Ministry has simultaneously maintained Russia's opposition 
to partition. This suggests that there may be some tension between the Russian energy 
complex's desire to reap quick financial rewards from the Caspian oil and the Kremlin's aim 
of retaining Russian influcene in the region. While the Energy Ministry's enthusiasm is 
probably prompted by the fact that many senior Russian government figures also have 
interests in Russian oil and gas companies already involved in the various Caspian consortia, 
there is also the deeper issue of the speed of Russia's emergence into international commerce. 
There wil l continue to be widespread reluctance on the part of international corporations (and 
particularly energy companies) to invest in Russia i f the Kremlin continues to put chauvinist 
nationalist policies ahead of its long-term economic stability. Turkmenistan has suffered 
from being seen as an unreliable regime to do business with; Russia can ill-afford to gain the 
same reputation by standing in the way of investment in the Caspian. Also, Russia wil l 
hardly benefit i f the oil companies decide not to risk serious long-term investment in the 
Caspian at all, having been discouraged by a seemingly endless succession of delays. 
Another argument that Russia has been quick to use in a number of occasions is the 
precarious ecological situation in the Caspian Sea. The two primary ecological concerns are 
the Caspian's extremely variable sea level, and the growing threat to the Beluga Sturgeon. 
Russia has repeatedly suggested, with some justification, that swift and effective joint 
management wi l l be required i f the littoral states are to avert a major environmental 
catastrophe. A wide variance in sea level threatens the largely agrarian coastal regions of all 
the littoral states, and it is feared that excessive drawing of water by the region's population 
1 3 Halliday, F, (1995), 'The empires strike back? Russia, Iran and the new republics' in The World Today, 
(November 1995): 220. 
1 4 Goble, P (1997) 'A Jump too Far?', Central Asia Monitor, 1,6. 
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and industry from the rivers feeding the inland sea has dramatically increased the range of the 
Caspian's usual cycles of sea level rise and fall. Meanwhile, the Caspian's Beluga Sturgeon 
population, representing about 90% of the world's stocks (and of the world's caviar 
production) is reported to be about three years from non-viability, due to post-Soviet 
overfishing allowed by the collapse of Soviet-era controls.15 Russia has claimed that the only 
way to avert the extinction of the sturgeon is for the states to work together, and the only way 
to ensure they do so effectively is to adopt a regime of condominium. However, it is 
certainly possible that Russia is using these perfectly valid ecological arguments as a 'flag of 
convenience' for a position really grounded in strictly commercial and political interests; the 
Soviet/Russian governments commitment to protecting the environment has been seen to be 
questionable, to say the least. 
Finally, and perhaps least importantly, is the question of rival military forces on the Caspian 
itself. The Caspian provides a large hole in Russia's 'southern rim' of buffer states, giving 
swift and easy access from the heart of radical Islam, Iran, directly into southern Russia. 
Russia will surely wish to keep foreign navies as far away from its Caspian shore as possible, 
yet Kazakhstan already has a Caspian flotilla, admittedly acquired from the Russians, and it 
would hardly be difficult for Iran to establish its own naval forces in the Caspian. Russia's 
determination to maintain its naval presence in the Caspian was demonstrated by the speed 
with which it created a new base in Astrakhan after losing its base in Baku to Azerbaijan. 
Entering into joint arguments with the other littoral states, as under condominium, might 
allow Russia to have a hand in regulating their naval activities. It is worth remembering that 
for long periods of time, especially under Soviet rule, Russian naval forces had a complete or 
near-monopoly on naval force in the Caspian, and there may be some Russian discomfort at 
the idea of facing Iranian boats on the Caspian. Russian nervousness over this issue may well 
explain its continued insistence that the Caspian should be demilitarised, even i f the Caspian 
is not to be managed as a condominium. Interestingly, Iran has adopted the same position, 
suggesting that both of the previous littoral states would be uncomfortable i f the Caspian 
were to hold five different navies. 
1 5 CNN News 28/5/97, seen by the author while in Ashgabat. 
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Azerbaijan 
At the other extreme of the legal spectrum, Azerbaijan has from the outset maintained that the 
Caspian should be entirely divided between the five littoral states. The Baku government's 
position is that the Caspian is an "international or boundary lake"16 and should be divided 
according to a sectoral approach. Under such a regime, each state would have absolute 
sovereignty over its sector, effectively exercising the same rights as it would have on land. In 
order to press its claim, Azerbaijan unilaterally declared its sovereignty over "its sector" of 
the Caspian in its constitution. The question of whether the Caspian is a sea or a lake wil l be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The Geopolitics Behind Azerbaijan's Position 
The Baku government's position is primarily based on economics. Dividing the Caspian into 
national sectors, whether according to the Law of the Sea or the old Soviet sectors, would 
give Azerbaijan the greatest possible control over the greatest possible amount of oil. This 
would maximise the revenue available to boost Azerbaijan's slowly-recovering economy, 
both in direct oil revenues and in the spin-offs of direct foreign investment in the region's 
infrastructure. This would in turn maximise Baku's freedom of action in relation to Russia, it 
being widely recognised that economic independence equates closely with political 
independence for the former Soviet states. Also, Azerbaijan can use its own oil to power its 
national energy sector, finally 'removing Russia's hand from the tap', and ending 
Azerbaijan's dependence on its former colonial power for its energy supplies. 
The economic recovery promised by oil revenues would also greatly improve Azerbaijan's 
position in relation to its traditional rival, even enemy, Armenia. Both countries have 
suffered greatly as a result of the ethnic conflict between Azerbaijanis and the Armenians of 
the Nagornyy Karabakh, supported by Armenia itself. Access to oil revenues might allow 
Azerbaijan swiftly to make good the economic and material damage of the war, while 
Armenia is still suffering from an economic blockade imposed upon it by Turkey, although 
this may soon be lifted. However, those same oil revenues could equally be used to reduce 
and even reverse Azerbaijan's current military disadvantages, which led to the loss of 20% of 
Draft Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, prepared by Azerbaijan, 12 October 1995, as cited 
in Vinogradov, S (1996) 'The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and its Hydrocarbon Resources', Boundaries and 
Energy: Problems and Prospects, Durham University, 18-19 July. 
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its territory to the 'Karabakh' Armenians during the war. This might encourage President 
Heydar Aliev's government to attempt to restore the country's territorial integrity by force, i f 
the Armenians will not relinquish the territories through negotiation. It should be borne in 
mind therefore that rapid foreign investment in Azerbaijan might destabilise the region in the 
short term, although in the long-term foreign economic involvement should encourage 
political stability. 
In domestic terms, demanding partition of the Caspian is by far the most attractive option 
open to Aliev. Firstly, i f Aliev can improve his country's economic situation with oil money, 
putting more money into the population's pockets, he wil l boost his own popularity. This is 
an important objective for Aliev, who faces a number of foreign and domestic threats to his 
rule. Secondly, adopting a strongly nationalist position wins votes among most Azerbaijanis, 
especially i f the perceived opponent is Russia, as in this case. It is still a fact of life in the 
former Soviet Union that standing up to the Russians is a vote-winner, and Aliev cannot 
afford to pass up the opportunity to cast himself in the role of champion Azerbaijan's rights in 
the international arena. 
Kazakhstan 
Adopting a position that might be seen as representing a kind of 'middle ground', Kazakhstan 
has proposed that the Caspian should be regarded as an "enclosed sea"17 as defined by the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. This would result in the sea being 
divided into 12-mile territorial seas and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) or Continental 
Shelf, with differing levels of state sovereignty applying to each zone. Given the size of the 
Caspian, claims to EEZ or continental shelf would inevitably overlap, again resulting in the 
partition of the sea among the five states. However, the five coastal states' freedom of 
navigation, or "right of innocent passage" would be enshrine in UNCLOS, 1 8 which also 
recommends that in such a situation, the parties involved co-operate to protect the marine 
environment. The states would retain sovereign rights to exploit the living and non-living 
resources in their national sectors. 
17 The Draft Convention of the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, prepared by Kazakhstan, August, 1994: latest 
version 20 October, 1995, as cited in Vinogradov, S (1996) 'The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and its 
Hydrocarbon Resources', Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospects, Durham University, 18-19 July. 
1 8 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Articles 17-26, as reproduced in The Law of the Sea, (1983) 
London: Croom Helm: 6-9. 
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The Geopolitics Behind Kazakhstan's Position 
The first point to note in any analysis of the Kazakh position is Almaty's insistence that the 
Caspian should be divided according to the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), 
rather than according to the Soviet-era sectors. The reason for this is not at first apparent, 
until one takes a closer look at the terms of the UN Convention. I f a Law of the Sea approach 
were adopted, while the sea would be divided into almost the same areas as by the adoption 
of the Soviet-era sectors, the status of those areas would be very different. Under the Law of 
the sea, Kazakhstan would be able to claim the right of innocent passage across the waters of 
the other littoral states, where it could not do so under a straight sectoral delimination. This 
could be important i f Kazakhstan wishes, for instance to use oil tankers to export small 
quantities of oil to Iran, as recently agreed by the two sides. Perhaps even more significantly, 
the Kazakhs would also be able to lay a submarine pipeline across the 'Russian' sector of the 
Caspian seabed, without the threat of a Russian veto. Precedent in international law 
regarding pipelines suggests that Kazakhstan would be free to lay such a pipeline without 
Russian approval, provided that doing so was not directly detrimental to Russian interests, 
which it would not be (in a legal sense). There would also be scope to insist on joint 
environmental controls, a measure recommended by the Convention. 
The other reasons for Kazakhstan's insistence on a division of the Caspian into national 
waters are rather more obvious. Kazakhstan stands to gain unfettered access to much greater 
oil deposits i f the Caspian is divided than i f it is governed under a condominium, and this wil l 
increase the country's overall economic and political independence. However, by calling for 
partition under the Law of the Sea Convention, to which Russia is a signatory, Kazakhstan is 
able to press for what it wants without appearing to pursue a particularly nationalist, anti-
Russian policy, like Azerbaijan. Instead it can appeal to claims of fairness and international 
law to justify its position, although there would in fact be little practical difference between 
the Kazakh and Azerbaijan proposals i f implemented. 
Iran and Turkmenistan 
Iran and Turkmenistan, meanwhile, have adopted positions that seem to have varied 
according to the circumstances prevailing at the time. Iran has generally called for joint 
sovereignty over the Caspian, in broad agreement with Russia, but this did not prevent Tehran 
47 
from trying to become involved with an international consortium looking to develop fields in 
Azerbaijan's declared sector. It is noticeable that Iran became a more vigorous supporter of 
joint sovereignty after having been prevented from taking part in the international consortium 
by US pressure. On the other hand, Turkmenistan was the first of the littoral states to claim 
territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone, in 1993,19 but it then joined Russia and Iran 
in calling for joint management of the Caspian's resources and opposing unilateral 
development of the Caspian's oil fields. Nevertheless, a recent decision to hold a tender for 
rights to exploit offshore fields would seem to indicate a reversion to a 'unilateralist' point of 
view. This has been borne out recently, Turkmenistan laying claim to the 'Chirag' and 
'Azeri' field in January 1997,20 Azerbaijan having granted a license to explore the field to an 
international consortium. 
The Geopolitics Behind The Iranian Position 
Iran's position regarding the future status of the Caspian has essentially been dictated by the 
continuing economic and political sanctions imposed upon it by the American government. It 
is reasonable to suggest that Tehran's recent support for condominium over the Caspian is a 
direct result of the US-inspired decision not to allow Iranian companies to participate in the 
AIOC oil consortium. Having therefore been denied commercial access to oil in the former 
Soviet sector of the Caspian, the only option that would give Iran access to oil beyond the 
negligible amounts in its own sector of the sea is condominium. Has Iranian companies been 
allowed into AIOC, the Tehran government would almost certainly have come to support 
delimitation, but currently condominium offers Iran's only opportunity to gain access to 
Caspian oil. Additionally, supporting condominium offers the Iranians the chance to hit back 
at Azerbaijan, after having been 'betrayed' by the former Soviet state and presumably 
wasting the financial and political capital invested in securing a share in the consortium. 
Other possible motives for Iran's support of condominium are slightly more geopolitical in 
nature, rather than commercial. I f the Caspian's oil reserves were held jointly by all five 
littoral states, then Iran would be in a perfect position to cause trouble for US investment in 
the Caspian's oil fields, or alternatively it would be much more difficult for the US to demand 
1 9 Vinogradov, S (1996) 'The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and its Hydrocarbon Resources', Boundaries and 
Energy: Problems and Prospects, Durham University, 18-19 July. 
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Iran's exclusion from joint exploitation of the oil reserves. The Tehran government might 
also be able to use its position as a lever to extract more favourable treatment by the US 
government, in exchange for not blocking US oil companies involvement in the Caspian oil 
industry. There may also be another, rather more Machiavellian reason for Iran's insistence 
on condominium. Recent statements from various Russian ministries and the Kremlin have 
served to suggest that Russia may be coming to accept the eventual delimitation of the 
Caspian. Were delimitation to be accepted by all the parties, full development of the Caspian 
oil fields could quickly follow. However, i f Iran were to continue to insist on condominium, 
the legal implications of this might deter full-scale investment, delaying the appearance of 
Caspian oil on the market. Any such delay would in itself be in Iran's interests, as this would 
keep the focus of the international oil industry on the Persian Gulf, where Iran is much more 
able to influence events. 
The Geopolitics Behind The Turkmen Position 
The almost constant shifts in Turkmenistan's policy toward Caspian sovereignty make its 
geopolitical aims difficult to assess. However, its recent unofficial shift to support 
delimitation (as indicated by its dispute with Azerbaijan over the Caspian) was almost 
certainly prompted by the desire to profit financially from the continuing unilateral 
exploitation of Caspian oil by Azerbaijan. While President Niyazov's government still 
officially backs Russia's demands for condominium, the autocratic Turkmen leader is not 
such an ideologue as to miss out on a golden opportunity to raise hard currency. 
Furthermore, an initial look at the relative strengths of the Azerbaijani and Turkmen claims to 
the disputed fields would suggest that Turkmenistan is in a much stronger position, and 
should be able to extract significant concessions from the Baku government. Turkmenistan's 
support of condominium or joint sovereignty was in any case always qualified by a 
requirement that states should still be entitled to territorial waters out to 12 nautical miles, 
giving a further indication that Turkmenistan's position was more pragmatic than principled. 
While Turkmenistan is still dependent on Russia for much of its trade, and for its continuing 
ability to export gas via the former Soviet pipeline network, President Niyazov, who is in any 
case firmly pro-Russian, remains unlikely to directly challenge Russian policy. However, this 
Interfax News Agency, Moscow, 26 January 1997, 13 February 1997 reported in BBC Summary of World 
Broadcast, SU/2828, 2844. 
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will not present him from simultaneously pursuing apparently contradictory policies of his 
own. 
Another facet of Turkmenistan's Caspian policy has been continuing support for Iran. The 
reasons for this are very simple. The Turkmen government has ambitious plans to export its 
vast gas reserves, and the shortest route for Turkmen gas to the world market is via Iran. Iran 
is aware of this, and has consequently put some effort into improving relations with its former 
Soviet neighbour. 
A Sea or a Lake - Is that the question? 
Now to return to the issue of whether the Caspian is a sea or a lake under international law. 
Much has been made of this issue, many authors apparently feeling that the question may 
9 1 
have some bearing on the question of the sea's division. As wil l be discussed in a moment, 
this is a complex and perhaps somewhat misleading debate, but it is instructive to examine 
the argument anyway. 
Kazakhstan has proposed that the Caspian may be defined as an "enclosed sea" under the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, and any legal regime for the Caspian should 
therefore be based on that Convention. Article 122 of the Convention defines an enclosed (or 
semi-enclosed) sea as: 
"...a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the 
ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and 
exclusive zones of two or more coastal states. " 
It is clear that the Caspian has no natural outlet, narrow or otherwise, to another sea, and so 
does not qualify on that basis. 
2 1 For instance: Bundy, R. R. (1995) 'The Caspian - Sea or Lake? Consequences in International Law', paper 
given at the conference Oil & Caviar in the Caspian, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, 24-25 February. Also: Uibopuu, H-J, (1995) 'The Caspian Sea: a tangle of legal problems', The World 
Today, June: 119-123. 
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However, i f all the parties wishes to regard the Caspian as a sea and declared territorial seas 
and economic zones, it may be argued that there is no reason why it should not qualify under 
the second clause, that it should consist "...entirely...of the territorial seas and exclusive 
economic zones " of the littoral states. 
However, this argument seems flawed; the Caspian is not entirely divided into territorial seas 
and exclusive economic zones, because not all the parties have agreed that this should be the 
case. In fact, at the current time, there is no definitive legal regime in effect. The Caspian 
could equally be regarded as an international lake, although certainly a salt lake of unique 
size. In which case, the rules concerning the division of international watercourses could be 
deemed to apply, and the Caspian divided into national sectors. But, again, there are no hard 
and fast rules which require the parties to adopt such an approval. Nor is there any generally 
accepted method of deliminating an international lake. So what is the answer? 
In fact, the problem is not how to go about defining the Caspian in order to allow its 
delimitation, but whether it should be delimited at all. Sea or lake, what is important is that 
all five parties agree on the legal regime that is implemented. The coastal states are at liberty 
to introduce any regime they see fit, be it condominium, sectoral partition into national zones 
or delimitation according to the principles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. But 
it is clear from the body of international law that any agreement must be acceptable to all the 
parties involved. 
Whether the Caspian should be divided or not is beyond the scope of this discussion, as it is 
not a question of international law. Rather, it is fundamentally a question for the parties 
themselves to settle via negotiation or some means of third-party settlement procedure, such 
as recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). What shall now be discussed are some 
possible regimes for the Caspian and some of the geopolitical implications for the parties 
involved. (See Figure 4, page 52.) 
Possible regimes: Condominium 
The Russian proposal that the Caspian should be managed by all the parties as a 
condominium is arguably the weakest of the various proposals made to date. 
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Figure 4 
Possible Delimitations of the Caspian, in Relation to Oil and Gas Fields 
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There is only a single precedent for the designation of a maritime space as a condominium; 
the Gulf of Fonseca case involving Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua. In that case, the 
International Court of Justice decided that the Gulf, having previously been under the 
jurisdiction of the Spanish Empire, had always been utilised as a 'strategic unity' 2 2 and there 
was no case for ending that practice just because there as now more than one country 
involved 
In that particular case, the disputing parties agreed to take the matter to the ICJ for arbitration 
and to accept the judgement, and the ICJ made its decision on the basis of a unique historical 
context. Also, it should be emphasised that in every example of condominium other than the 
Gulf of Fonseca case, the creation of such a regime has been based on the explicit agreement 
of the disputing parties. There would seem to be little hope of achieving a consensus among 
the Caspian littoral states on this issue. 
It is difficult to see how such a precedent may easily be applied to the Caspian. Despite 
arguments based on the now familiar phrase "Soviet and Iranian sea ", there is no evidence 
that either party to the earlier treaties actually regarded themselves as having joint 
sovereignty over the Caspian. There was no consultation involving the limited exploitation 
of hydrocarbons that did occur, nor any explicit agreement concerning any form of 
sovereignty beyond the national fishing zones. Instead, it would appear that the parties 
effectively regarded the Caspian as lying outside national jurisdiction. On that basis, 
although it is an option, condominium over the whole Caspian seems unlikely. 
The Geopolitical Implications of a Caspian Condominium 
The adoption of a regime of condominium for the Caspian would signal a significant victory 
for Russian foreign policy, and would also greatly benefit Iran. The three 'new' littoral states 
have more to gain from the delimitation of the sea into national zones. Such a decision would 
irrevocably weaken the new states campaign for increased political and economic 
independence, as Russia would retain partial control of the Caspian oil reserves. Already the 
dominant power in the region, Russia would then be able to dictate the pace and scale of 
Caspian oil development to suit itself rather than the needs of its Caspian 'partners'. Iran 
ICJ, (1992) Report (Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute): para. 432. 
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meanwhile would gain access to oil reserves otherwise beyond its reach, and would be in a 
position to directly influence the access of US-based oil companies to the region, to its own 
economic and political benefit. Condominium could therefore be regarded as a victory for 
the region's old Great Powers, maintaining the new littoral states' ties to their old master. 
Possible Regimes: National Zones 
Alternatively, the Caspian could be partitioned to give each coastal state its own national 
zone. This could be done in either of two ways. 
Firstly, division could be based on precedents concerning the partition of international lakes, 
resulting in the delimitation of national sectors. These precedents would suggest, but do not 
require, that such a delimitation be based at least initially on the principle of equidistance. 
While the basic method of division according to equidistance can be altered in a number of 
ways to reflect specific local circumstances, in the Caspian's case, with relatively simple 
coastlines and no major offshore islands, the adoption of a strict equidistance line would 
result in quite a simple delimitation. Such a line is drawn by ensuring that every point along 
it is equidistant from the nearest basepoints on the baselines of the states concerned. A line 
drawn in such a way would ensure an equitable division of the Caspian, reflecting the length 
of the parties' coastlines. Within their national zones, the parties would have absolute 
jurisdiction, in the same way as they would on land. There would be no requirement to allow 
freedom of navigation, although the parties would obviously be at liberty to adopt a regime 
allowing transit of foreign vessels across national waters. 
Partition could alternatively be achieved by adopting the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 1982, and dividing the Caspian into territorial seas and Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs). (To repeat, even though the Law of the Sea may not automatically be applied here, it 
may be i f the parties agree to do so.) Under such a regime, each state would be entitled to 
declare territorial seas out to 12 nautical miles (nm) from its coast and an EEZ out to 200nm. 
Within its territorial sea, the state would have absolute jurisdiction, similar to that conferred 
in the sectoral approach outlined above, save for the right of foreign ships to "innocent 
passage ". Within its EEZ, the state would have the exclusive right to exploit both living and 
non-living resources found there, but would be required to recognise the right of other 
parties' vessels to cross their territory, allowing all states freedom of navigation in the central 
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area of the Caspian which lay beyond territorial sea. I f the Law of the Sea was adopted in its 
entirety, the parties would also be faced with the suggestion that they co-operate in protecting 
the Caspian's marine environment, something that would be highly desirable considering the 
potential pollution the Caspian faces as the littoral states undergo a period of industrial 
development.23 
The Law of the Sea Convention specifically requires (in Articles 74 and 83) that any 
delimitation of continental shelf or EEZ be done in such a way as to "achieve and equitable 
solution. " 2 4 Although there is a great diversity in state practice and case law as to the method 
of delimiting national boundaries, in many cases, and particularly for opposite states, 
equidistance has provided the starting point for negotiations. I f the disputing parties chose to 
adopt this approach, there is a mass of case law on which to base their final agreement. 
The Geopolitical Implications of Partition 
A legal decision to partition the Caspian would represent a victory for the three newly-
independent states, as this would allow them unfettered access to the oil reserved in their 
national sectors. This would in turn maximise their opportunity to increase their economic 
and hence political independence. As such, partition would represent the worst-case scenario 
for Russia, for precisely the same reason. As far as Russian policy makers are concerned, 
any strengthening of the former Soviet states can only come at Russia's expense. Therefore, 
unless Russia felt able to benefit commercially by the involvement of its companies in the 
international consortia developing the Caspian, the Russian government might feel it 
necessary to do whatever it could to keep Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan within 
its sphere of influence. This might lead to political conflict and instability in the region as 
Russia flexed its muscles to 'remind' the three states where their 'best interests' lay. 
Partition might also represent the best outcome for the US and the wider international 
community. America would see partition and the three new states independent access to 
Caspian oil as the first step to their conversion to democratic states committed to the open 
market, while it is generally recognised by the international community that it would be 
2 3 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Articles 74(3), 83(3) as reproduced in The Law of the Sea, 
(1983) London: Croom Helm: 6-9. Also Schofield, C (1997) Principles of Maritime Delimitation. 
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preferable for the former Soviet countries to have the right to choose their own destiny, rather 
than remaining under Russia's influence. Iran meanwhile would probably view such a 
decision as a setback, as it would not have gained access to the Caspian's oil reserves, and 
would be unlikely to do so commercially while the American government remained 
determined to prevent Iranian inclusion in American-led consortia in the region. 
Possible Regimes: Joint Development Zones 
The last potential regime that will be examined here is the use of joint development zones. It 
should be made clear that this is not the same as condominium. Joint development zones still 
effectively imply some form of national sovereignty, while condominium requires the sharing 
of sovereignty. A variety of different joint sovereignty regimes are summarised in the 
diagram overleaf. 
One possible rationale for such a regime may be found in the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, Articles 74(3) and 83(3). These articles, relating to the delimitation of exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, state that: 
"Pending agreement...the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, 
shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, 
during this transitional period, not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final agreement. 
Such agreements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation. " 
This pronouncement has been supported by an increasing body of state practice, to the extent 
that it is becoming clear that states are becoming more and more likely to resort to a joint 
development agreement as an equitable means of solving their dispute, at least in the interim 
prior to a more comprehensive resolution. 
The situation in the Caspian is a unique one in that the disputing parties are all aware of the 
position and potential of many of the predicted offshore hydrocarbon deposits. 
2 4 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Articles 74(1), 83(1) as reproduced in The Law of the Sea, 
(1983) London: Croom Helm: 6-9. 
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Figure 5 
JOINT ZONE A R R A N G E M E N T S 
P H Y S I C A L S T R U C T U R E 
1 Example : 
Japan - South Korea (1974) 
Boundary in dispute : 
Joint economic zone undivided 
2 Example : 
Colombia - Dominican Republic (1978) 
A 
B 
Boundary agreed : 
Joint fishing / scientific zone equally 
distributed 
3 Example : 
Iceland - Norway (1982) 
\ 
B 
Boundary agreed : 
Joint economic zone unequally divided 
4 Example : 
Bahrain - Saudi Arabia (1958) 
B 
Boundary agreed : 
Joint zone undivided but oil revenues shared 
5 Example : 
Australia - Indonesia (1991) 
6 Example : 
Sudan - Saudi Arabia (1974) 
OVER 
1000 
METRES 
DEEP 
Boundary undecided : 
Degrees of co-operation agreed 
B 
Boundary undecided : 
Common mineral zone defined by depth 
Agreed boundary , Joint economic / development zone 
Source: University o f Durham Cartographic Service 
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This will obviously exert a great deal of pressure on negotiations between the parties, who 
stand to gain or lose perhaps millions of dollars of revenues in the event of a particular 
boundary being 'moved' even one kilometre. In such a situation, it could be argued that the 
best resolution to the dispute would be to declare joint development zones in areas where 
existing deposits straddle a potential boundary. (Assuming of course that those parties 
advocating joint sovereignty over the Caspian agreed to such an approach.) This could be 
applied to particular fields on an individual basis, or, in a way similar to that proposed in 
November 1996, could be applied to a large part of the Caspian, while granting each state a 
national zone out to an agreed limit. Such agreements would avoid the immediate need to 
reach an agreement on the Caspian's legal regime except in the broadest sense, and 
consequently allow a much speedier resolution of the situation. 
Effectively what would occur is that the disputing states, whether there were two, three, four 
or five of them, would agree to postpone resolution of the boundary in a particular area, 
instead opting to jointly develop the resources within it. This would result in the involved 
states each agreeing to accept a particular share of the revenues generated by development, 
while agreeing that this would not in any way prejudice a final settlement of the position of 
the boundary. This would enable all the parties to develop the resources of the Caspian, 
benefiting all of them, while avoiding the question of sovereignty until a more favourable 
atmosphere had been achieved. 
It has been argues that there is in fact an emerging obligation to jointly develop disputed 
reserves in the absence of agreement,25 although it should also be realised that: 
"joint development it too complex a subject to be viewed as...the tidy conclusion to a 
deadlocked situation."26 
Shihata, 1 & Onorato, W (1992) 'Joint Development of International Petroleum Resources in Undefined and 
Disputed Areas', International Conference LAW ASIA Energy Section, Kuala Lumpur, 18-22 October, cited in 
Vinogradov, S (1996) "The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and its Hydrocarbon Resources" Boundaries and 
Energy: Problems and Prospects, Durham University, 18-19 July. 
2 6 Townsend-Gault, I & Stormont, W (1995) 'Offshore Petroleum Joint Development Arrangements: Functional 
Instrument? Compromise? Obligation?', The peaceful management of transboundary Resources, London: 51-76, 
cited in Vinogradov, S (1996) 'The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and it Hydrocarbon Resources', Boundaries 
and Energy: Problems and Prospects, Durham University, 18-19 July. 
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I f all the parties agreed to adopt the UN Law of the Sea Convention, there would be a clear 
obligation, on the parties to make every effort to reach "provisional arrangements of a 
practical nature. " With the current variance in the parties' legal positions the question 
becomes more contentious, and it again becomes difficult to reach any definitive statement on 
the nature of customary international law in this matter. An additional complication would be 
those concessions already granted unilaterally by a number of the parties. It would certainly 
be difficult to come up with a comprehensive legal regime that made allowance for 
unilaterally granted concessions while at the same time achieving equitability to the 
satisfaction of all parties. How such an agreement could be achieved is more difficult to 
anticipate. Those parties proposing condominium might feel uncomfortable with joint 
development proposals, fearing that they leave the door open for a less favourable agreement 
later on, while the parties wishing to partition the Caspian completely wil l obviously be 
reluctant to divide what they see as 'their' resources when it seems they might be able to go 
ahead and develop them anyway in the absence of an agreement. It has to be said though that 
some form of joint development might represent the most equitable resolution to this dispute, 
and might be the easiest to achieve in that it wil l allow all the states to begin developing the 
Caspian's resources quickly. 
The Geopolitical Impact of Joint Development Arrangements 
The geopolitical impact of joint development arrangements would essentially be the same as 
that of the adoption of a condominium regime. Currently able to negotiate from a position of 
strength, Russia would be able to impose its own terms on the other Caspian states. 
However, as stated above, provided the right form of joint regime could be agreed, this route 
might represent the quickest way of beginning ful l development of the Caspian's oil fields. 
This would benefit the newly-independent states, as they would at least be receiving some 
benefit from the Caspian's oil reserves. Russian dominance over the Caspian wil l probably 
be a fact of life for the other littoral states for the foreseeable future, and Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan cannot afford to wait too long for the arrival of oil revenues. 
The Current Situation 
So having looked at some of the legal regimes that could be applied to the Caspian Sea, and 
their geopolitical implications it is worth noting the current situation of negotiations between 
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the parties. Until January 1998, when Turkmenistan launched its challenge to Azerbaijan's 
claim to the Chirag and Azeri fields, it seemed that there might be some grounds for 
optimism. This was primarily based on the summit of November 1996, which saw the 
emergence of a proposal combining national and joint sovereignty. It was reported that four 
of the five states had accepted in principle a proposal whereby the states would agree to 45nm 
national zones immediately adjacent to their coasts, and the central core of the Caspian would 
be subject to "joint ownership". While it was not made clear whether this joint ownership 
meant condominium or joint development, this was the first proposal that could be taken as a 
compromise between the 'partition' and the 'condominium' positions. It was apparently 
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further suggested that in specific cases, states could be granted "pinpoint jurisdiction" over 
individual fields. However, Azerbaijan reportedly refused the proposal, and without clearer 
information regarding the specifics of the proposal it is difficult to reach any judgement upon 
it. 
There were also two joint declarations in April and May 1996, involving Russia and 
Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan and Iran, 2 8 which once again called for a speedy settlement to 
the dispute and suggested a new Convention to address issues regarding navigation, 
resources, environmental protection and the determination of the limits of national 
jurisdiction. This was followed in November 1996 by an announcement by Russia, Iran and 
Turkmenistan that they would be setting up a joint company to exploit the resources in their 
national zones, later operations to be defined by the Caspian's future status. The agreement 
was apparently left open to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan although neither have yet joined it. 
These moves seemed to indicate an increased willingness to compromise on the part of at 
least some of the parties, possibly because outside interests seem to be more sceptical about 
investing in the region the longer the dispute goes on. However, the current controversy 
between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over the Chirag and Azeri fields make it clear that 
there are still many strongly-held opinions about individual states' rights in the Caspian. In 
such an atmosphere, the legal details are less important than the overall state of the 
relationships between the five parties. Rather than a definitive legal judgement, what it 
needed is a willingness on the part of all the states to reach an agreement. 
Russian-Kazakh Joint Declaration on Co-operation in the Use of the Caspian Sea, 27 April, 1996, and 
Kazakh-Iranian Joint Declaration on the Caspian Sea Issues, 11 May, 1996. 
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Prospects 
To sum up briefly, then, it is clear that the prime legal question in the Caspian dispute is not 
whether to define the Caspian as a sea or a lake, prior to discussing how to divide it, but 
rather to decide whether or not it should be divided at all. That issue is independent of 
whether we are talking about 'Lake Caspian' or the Caspian Sea. There is no clear 
recommendation in international law that a sea or a lake must be divided, although there is a 
greater mass of case law to suggest some form of partition that to suggest condominium, or 
joint sovereignty. 
In order to generate some discussion, it seems reasonable to suggest a possible solution, 
although it would not be proper to suggest that one solution would be "better" than another. 
Using the weight of precedent as some sort of indicator would seem to suggest that a regime 
of condominium is the least likely solution to this issue; there is simply no genuinely 
applicable precedent, the Gulf of Fonseca case included. On the other hand, there are many 
precedents for partition according to either the Law of the Sea or an international lake 
sectoral approach. The most equitable solution would seem likely to be based on limited 
national jurisdiction, out to agreed limits, opening the rest of the sea to joint development. 
This would have the advantage of being almost acceptable to everyone and completely 
acceptable to no one, which would seem the definition of a perfect compromise! 
However, it is important to realise that the deciding factor in any resolution of the Caspian 
will not be an obscure point of international law, or whether the Caspian is a sea or a lake, but 
the ability of the five littoral states to reach an agreement. This in turn wil l depend on the 
national leaderships having the political will to try to reach a compromise in the face of 
political pressures that might make an obstructive form of nationalism more attractive than 
co-operation. 
This paper wi l l now go on to discuss another central theme in the geopolitics of the Caspian 
basin; the export of the region's oil reserves, and in particular the routes that export pipelines 
will follow. 
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Chapter 4 
Pipelines To Prosperity: The Battle Over Export Routes 
Introduction 
The sovereignty dispute over the Caspian has largely been driven by the hydrocarbon 
deposits found beneath it. As has been explained previously, the large oil and gas reserves 
thought to lie beneath the Caspian represent much more to the five littoral states than a source 
of revenue, although their simple monetary value is obviously a very significant 
consideration for the three newly-independent states in particular. Their fragile post-Soviet 
economies desperately need the boost that oil and gas export revenues would provide. 
Nevertheless, the real value of these deposits to Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan is 
their potential to provide greater political freedom from their former master, Russia. 
Currently, Russian dominance of the post-Soviet market leaves the three new republics 
dependent on trade with Russia or through Russia, and at an economic disadvantage, with 
even basic infrastructure such as roads, railways and existing pipelines all leading to Moscow. 
This in turn limits the ability of the governments of the three republics to negotiate in the 
political sphere, with the Kremlin holding the economic 'trump card'. Greater economic 
independence would lead to greater political independence, by allowing these states to 
gradually turn their economies away from Moscow and to the wider world. This would force 
Russia to deal with the emerging economies on fairer terms, as Moscow had to come to terms 
with outside competition in what has traditionally been its 'backyard'. 
However, the possession of these resources would not in itself be sufficient to improve the 
economic and political situation of the three new states. To be worth anything, the oil and gas 
must be exported to the outside world, where they could be sold at fair, world market prices, 
rather than the extremely low prices or barter deals they would be offered by any of their 
former Soviet neighbours, who in any case do not currently create enough demand to absorb 
anything but a fraction of the Caspian basin's oil reserves. Only two transport media wil l 
allow the export of economically significant amounts of oil and gas: large oil-tankers at sea, 
and pipelines under the sea or across the land. Unfortunately for Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and 
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Turkmenistan, they and the Caspian itself are all landlocked. Therefore, they wil l have to 
have pipelines to carry their oil either direct to customers further afield or to waiting tankers 
with access to the world's oceans. In either case, these pipelines wil l have to cross 
neighbouring states' territory to reach the wider world. It is that basic 'fact of life ' that has 
led to the highly complex manoeuvring by the oil and gas states and their neighbours to have 
the pipelines follow particular routes, each route apparently benefiting only some of the states 
concerned. 
The various state and non-state actors directly involved in this competition over pipeline 
routes have been: the five littoral states, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan; Georgia, Armenia (including the Karabakh Armenians) and the Chechens; 
Turkey; the US; most of the world's major oil/gas companies; the Western European states; 
and latterly China, the Taleban movement in Afghanistan, and Pakistan. With such a wide 
range of competing interests, it is hardly surprising that the debate over the choice of route 
for the long-term export of oil and gas from the region has continued until the present with 
only a few real signs of any decision being reached. 
Four Key Powers 
The debate over pipeline routes has been dominated by the interests of four key players: 
Russia, Iran, Turkey and the US. While it might be expected that, i f the playing field were 
level, the oil and gas states themselves would be able to dictate the choice of routes, this has 
not been the case. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan find themselves in an 
extremely disadvantageous position, despite holding such large hydrocarbon reserves, 
primarily due to their location and recent history. Cut off from the outside world by stronger 
neighbours, and economically dependent on one of them, Russia, they have lacked the 
political leverage to impose their own preferences on the oil and gas companies. This has left 
the future of their oil and gas exports to be decided by the competing interests of their 
neighbours and the global superpower, America. 
While there are a multiplicity of potential routes under discussion, certain fundamental 
parameters have been established by the interaction of the four big players: 
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• Some o i l 1 wi l l have to be piped across Russia. Despite Russia's decline from superpower 
status, it still has enough power to make life very difficult, i f not impossible, for anyone 
trying to export oil exclusively by routes outside Russian territory. 
• In the current political climate, large-scale exports of oil through Iran are all but 
impossible. The American government's continuing policy of containment prohibits 
American oil companies from investing in or selling engineering technology to Iran i f 
those activities might benefit the Iranian government, and its alleged support of 
international terrorism. As currently interpreted, this policy prevents American 
involvement in a new pipeline across Iran, and might lead to American legal action 
against non-American companies who are seen to have broken US sanctions. (Smaller-
scale swaps and sales may still be possible: see below). 
• The US government's interests, both nationally and in a wider, 'philosophical' sense, wi l l 
have to be served by any final decision on export routes. While these interests wil l be 
discussed more specifically below, essentially these are: any route should be decided 
according to free-market principles, albeit with some restrictions; any route should not 
run counter to US national interests, or those of its friends in the region; oil exports 
should serve to increase stability in the region, and increase the independence of the 
newly-independent states. With Russia currently considered a 'friend' (or at least not an 
enemy) of the US, there will inevitably be a certain tension between these broad 
principles. 
• Turkey, as America's closest ally in the region, expects American support in its bid for an 
export route to pass through its territory, and has received i t . 2 Also, as a pro-Western, 
capitalist country with a proven record in international trade and investment, Turkey is in 
many ways the most attractive route out of the Caspian as far as the oil companies 
themselves are concerned. 
' For the moment, the discussion will focus on oil pipelines. This is a reflection of the fact that, due to the 
quicker returns offered by oil pipelines, and the focus of the political debate on oil, it is highly likely that oil 
pipelines will be constructed first. It has been suggested by a number of observers that the routes eventually 
chosen for the oil pipelines will almost certainly then be followed by any gas pipelines. 
2 Turkish appeals to the US government led to an overnight change of position in Washington in the days 
immediately before the 'Twin-Track' decision. It was American pressure on behalf of Turkey that led to the 
adoption of the southern, Georgian route. However, continued American support would depend on the 
political/religious make-up of future Turkish governments. As described in Roberts, J, (1996) Caspian 
Pipelines, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
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These parameters have been recognised in many of the proposed pipeline routes, though by 
no means all. The effective weight of each of these conditions have changed over time, with 
changes in the relative influence of each of the parties, and in their relationships with the oil 
producing states. As these shifts have been recognised by those involved, so the various 
proposals have seemed more or less attractive over time. So far, with the exception of the 
'Twin Track' decision of 9 October 1995, these shifts have been regular enough to preclude 
any final decisions on routes for the long-term export of the Caspian's oil and gas. A number 
of the more realistic routes proposed wil l now be discussed, along with one or two that seem 
unlikely to be adopted in the long-run, but which have been included because they allow 
some useful points to be made about the wide range of pressures at work in the ongoing 
debate over the export of the Caspian's oil and gas. 
A Multitude of Options 
Baku - Novorossiysk 
(See map overleaf for a map of the pipeline routes described below.) This route is currently 
the only one in operation, having recently been opened by Azerbaijan's President Aliev. The 
pipeline runs from Baku to Groznyy then on to Tikhoretsk and finally to the Russian Black 
Sea port of Novorossiysk, using existing Russian pipeline. It was the pre-existence of the 
Russian pipeline connection to Baku that made this the most obvious choice for exports of 
Azerbaijan's 'early oi l ' . 'Early oi l ' is the term used to describe the oil that is to be produced 
in the immediate future, from known fields, without the need for further exploration, large-
scale infrastructure investment and wholly new export routes. The export of this early oil 
wil l demonstrate the commercial viability of the longer-term exploitation of the Caspian 
reserves, and help finance later investment in new fields and facilities. It has also been 
assumed that, assuming they work, the routes used for the export of the early oil wil l be 
strong contenders for the long-term export of the bulk of the Caspian's oil when ful l 
production is commenced. 
The adoption of the Baku-Novorossiysk route was a fairly explicit recognition of Russia's 
dominant position regarding the export of Azerbaijan's Caspian oil. 
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Figure 6 
Possible Oil Pipeline Routes 
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Almost from its creation, the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) 
consortium, which signed the 'Deal of the Century' with Baku in September 1994, made clear 
its assumption that at least a proportion of Azerbaijan's oil would have to be exported via 
Russia. As well as being based partly on the existence of Russian pipelines suitable for the 
task, this decision was influenced by the oil companies' recognition that the long-term 
success of their Caspian operations would depend on Russian goodwill. Any attempt to 
bypass Russia would almost certainly lead to renewed Russian legal challenges over the 
sovereignty of the Caspian, and the companies' right to exploit the Caspian oil on behalf of 
Azerbaijan at all, not to mention future difficulties in their operations in the wider former 
Soviet Union. The fact that this route would also allow the quickest export of a reasonable 
amount of Azerbaijani oil for the lowest investment made it inevitable that, whatever the 
Baku government might have wished, a large proportion of Azerbaijani's oil would have to 
pass through Russian territory. Export via this route was only delayed by the time it took to 
reverse the flow of the Baku-Groznyy section of the line, which had previously run to Baku, 
and make repairs and upgrades to the ageing Soviet-era pipe. 
The Azerbaijani government in Baku would almost certainly have preferred that none of 
Azerbaijan's oil was exported via Russia. While a large part of Azerbaijan's oil wealth is 
exported across Russian territory, Russia will retain the ability to affect the country's 
economic and political fortunes. As has been demonstrated by Russia's ability to prevent 
exports from Kazakhstan by citing 'technical problems' and closing the pipes, Russia wi l l be 
able to stop the export of Azerbaijani oil across its territory any time it want to, international 
guarantees to the contrary notwithstanding. This Russian 'hand on the tap' wil l limit the 
Azerbaijani government's political and economic freedom to manoeuvre, by making it 
difficult to consider any action that might run counter to the Russian interests of the day. 
It was surely for precisely this reason that the Russian government lobbied so hard to have 
Azerbaijani oil exported across its territory. The transit fees which Moscow wil l levy on 
Azerbaijan for the right to export oil across Russia will be fairly significant. However, this 
economic gain wil l not have affected the thinking of the strongly nationalist and post-
imperialist Russian Foreign Ministry as greatly as the prospect of being able to control the 
destiny of a former imperial possession. Russia's desire to maintain its hegemony in the post-
Soviet space has been the single most important factor in its foreign policy regarding the 
Caspian states. With few i f any exceptions, the Russian government's actions in both the 
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Caspian sovereignty and pipeline debates have been prompted by this determination that 
Russia should at least be a regional superpower, i f not longer a global one. 
It has been reported3 that, until only hours before the 'Twin Track' decision whereby 
Azerbaijani oil would be exported by two pipelines, one to Novorossiysk and another through 
Georgia to the port of Supsa, the Baku-Novorossiysk route was set to be adopted as the only 
route for the export of Azerbaijan's early oil. However, at the last minute, Turkey appealed to 
Washington, and the US government rather forcefully proposed to the oil companies that a 
second pipeline should be used. Whether this was solely at Ankara's behest, or Baku had 
prevailed upon the Ankara government to make the appeals on its behalf, is unknown, but the 
adoption of the second, non-Russian route will have come as a relief to Azerbaijan. The 
Baku government could then look forward to knowing that at least some of its oil would be 
outside Russia's immediate control, i f not beyond its reach. Meanwhile, the adoption of the 
southern, Georgian route kept alive Turkish ambitions that, in the long-term, the bulk of the 
Caspian's oil could be exported across Turkey, as explained below. However, the adoption of 
the northern, Russian route wil l have come as a blow to Turkey's ambitions to act as the door 
to the Caspian region, threatening as it did to maintain Russia's dominant position. 
The fact that the Turkish government had to prevail upon Washington to ensure that more 
than one route was adopted indicates the slightly contradictory pressures exerted by 
America's various interests. It is a principle of American policy that the extension of free 
market practices to the widest possible world is in American interests, and this encourages a 
policy of non-intervention in American companies' dealings abroad. This would probably 
have led to the use of only one pipeline, through Russia. However, in this case, it was also in 
America's interests to ensure that Azerbaijan was able to export at least some of its oil 
independently of Russia, for the reasons outlined above. But it was also expedient not to 
cross the Russian government, it being seen as in America's long-term interests not to sour 
relations with a resurgent Russia. Hence the eventual compromise imposed by Washington: 
that while much of Azerbaijan's oil would be exported via Russia, enough would leave 
Azerbaijan via Georgia to increase Azerbaijan's independence. Baku may hope that the fact 
of an alternative export route wi l l encourage Russia not to interfere too much with exports 
across its territory, for fear of losing them to another route. 
3 Ibid 
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There are a number of practical problems surrounding the export of oil through 
Novorossiysk. Firstly, the Soviet-era pipelines running to the Russian port are in need of 
extensive repair and refurbishment, and due to their age wil l require more maintenance than a 
newer route. The port itself is less than perfect for the task. Bad weather can close the port 
completely for days, and this wi l l generally happen on a number of occasions in any year. 
Such closures not only interrupt exports and cost money, they also mean that oil arriving at 
the terminal must be stored; the pipeline cannot simply be switched on and off as necessary. 
The storage problem is the most significant of the two for Novorossiysk, as the terminal is 
already run at more than 100% of theoretical, desirable capacity. In the medium- to long-
term, therefore, it wi l l be necessary to increase storage facilities at the Russian terminal, 
which wil l add significantly to the route's start-up costs. The Tikhoretsk-Novorossiysk 
section of the route also has a smaller capacity than the rest of the line, creating a bottleneck 
which will have to be resolved before the early oil comes fully on-stream. There is also the 
question of increasing the number of oil tanker transits of the restricted waters of the 
Bosporous, but this wi l l be discussed below. 
A final noteworthy factor in the adoption of the Baku- Novorossiysk route is the ongoing 
civil unrest in Chechnya. It has been widely suggested that a major driving force behind the 
Russian 'invasion' of the breakaway republic was a determination publicly to bring the 
Chechen section of the route, through Groznyy, back under central control.4 Whatever the 
reasons for the Russian action, the failure to completely re-impose central rule has left the 
largely autonomous Chechen republic able to demand large amounts of money from the 
Russian treasury, as its share of any transit fees, in order to ensure the continued operation of 
the Chechen section of the pipeline.5 There is also the possibility that renewed unrest in the 
republic could disrupt the flow of oil, or that Chechen extremists could threaten the pipeline 
in order to extract concessions or simply a ransom from the Russian government. 
4 It is unlikely that this was the primary motivation behind the Kremlin's decision to intervene militarily in the 
Chechen unrest. It is more likely that overt military action became necessary after covert support for loyalist 
Chechens not only failed, but did so in an embarrassingly public way, with the capture of dozens of Russian 
'volunteers' by Chechen rebels throughout 1994. At that point, wider military action would have been seen by 
the Kremlin as necessary, in order to discourage other secessionist attempts and publicly restore the authority of 
central government. The bloody, drawn out conflict that followed would not have been justified simply by the 
existence of the pipeline. 
5 Roberts, J, (1996) Caspian Pipelines, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
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Baku - Supsa 
As already discussed, the adoption of a second route for the export of Azerbaijan's early oil, 
via a pipeline from Baku to the Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa was welcomed by both 
Azerbaijan and Turkey. Firstly, it meant that Azerbaijan would not be completely dependent 
on Russian goodwill for the continued export of its oil. Secondly, Turkey could still hope that 
this southern route would be extended south to its own terminal, Ceyhan, on the 
Meditteranean, when the time came to build a new, major pipeline to export the greater part 
of the Caspian's oil, as full-scale production began in new fields. Finally, the Americans, 
although requiring a prompt route from Ankara, achieved through some last-minute 
diplomatic pressure a compromise that apparently balanced all its conflicting interests, 
certainly in the short term. Russia, likely to keep its hand on the tap for much of Azerbaijan's 
early oil thanks to the retention of a northern route, had been reassured that no-one was trying 
to wrestle any of its client states out of its sphere of interest. The cause of Azerbaijan's 
economic and hence political independence had been furthered by the agreement to use a 
second, non-Russian route, and America's allies in Turkey were satisfied that there remained 
the real possibility of a Turkish export route. The quite real possibility that Azerbaijan might 
turn to Iran out of desperation for a non-Russian route had also been avoided. 
The decision was obviously also welcomed by Georgia, the fledgling republic standing to 
gain tens of millions of dollars in transit fees, and direct foreign investment in infrastructure 
to support the pipeline. The move also strengthened Georgia's campaign to become an 
important part of the European Union's TRACECA project, which aims to create a transit 
corridor between Europe and Central Asia, with new highways, railways and ferry routes 
linking Europe to the former Soviet states of Central Asia. 
On a first consideration, the decision to route at least part of Azerbaijan's oil exports through 
Georgia weakened Russia's position over its former client. As alluded to above, the more of 
Azerbaijan's oil that avoids Russia on its way to export markets, the greater Azerbaijan's 
independence. However, although the pipelines to Supsa lies beyond Russia's borders, it is 
very much within Russia's reach. There are large numbers of Russian troops based in 
Georgia, to protect the trans-Caucasus railway, 'assist' in the defence of Georgia's borders, 
and enforce a ceasefire between Georgian government forces and the forces of the breakaway 
Abkhaz republic. Therefore, although the southern 'Twin Track' pipeline should be safe from 
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adverse Russian attentions in the normal course of events, in the event of a deterioration of 
relations between Baku and Moscow, Russia has the capability to interrupt the flow of oil 
across Georgia almost as easily as across southern Russia itself. 
Russia has shown itself willing to interfere in the government of Georgia on a number of 
occasions. There was strong evidence of Russian military support for the Abkhaz separatists 
during their initial armed revolt, in which they drove Georgian forces out of Abkhazia, to the 
point of capturing Batumi, which was the first port of choice for the southern pipeline. The 
Russians were then quick to send troops in to help 'protect law and order' and 'restore peace' 
in Georgia when the country's president, Eduard Shevardnadze, dropped his stubborn refusal 
to take his country into the Commonwealth of Independent States and its Russian-dominated 
defence arrangements. While it would be an exaggeration to claim that continued peace and 
stability in Georgia are entirely dependent on Russia, it would be fair to say that it is within 
the Russian government's power to quickly destabilise the country, with all that would entail 
for the continued operation of an export pipeline. 
Two further factors impinge on both of the routes described above: the continuing conflict 
between the Armenians of the Nagornyy Karabakh and their ethnic brothers in Armenia 
itself, and Azerbaijan; and the problems of increasing the number of large oil tankers passing 
through the Bosporous. 
Ethnic Conflict 
The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the status of the Armenian enclave in 
Nagornyy Karabakh has further complicated the debate over pipeline routes from Azerbaijan. 
While never really an option for the export of early oil, one proposed route for the later oil 
was a line running from Azerbaijan proper, across Armenia for a short distance, through 
Azerbaijan's Nakichevan enclave and into Turkey, largely following the Aras river valley. 
The route had the advantage of being significantly shorter than a route through Georgia and 
into Turkey, and the use of the river valley would make construction of the pipeline very 
much easier. However, the outbreak of hostilities between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and 
the subsequent capture of nearly 20% of Azerbaijan by Armenian forces has made such a line 
impossible. It has also had the effect of leaving the proposed Baku-Supsa line within easy 
reach of Armenian forces in Azerbaijan, as the route passes within about 20km of the 
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frontline between the two sides. The possible vulnerability of the line to Armenian forces in 
the event of renewed hostilities may give both sides pause for thought. It is worth noting 
however, that international oil pipelines of this kind have rarely been closed for any length of 
time by the outbreak of war. Nevertheless, repeated terrorist attacks on oil pipelines in South 
America have demonstrated their vulnerability of disruption, i f not outright closure. 
It was subsequently proposed that a pipeline crossing Armenia could be used as an incentive 
to broker a peace deal between the two sides. However, the apparent intractability of the 
dispute would seem to rule out any such pipeline in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, it was 
also proposed that instead of crossing Armenia, the pipeline could be diverted across the 
border into Iran for a short distance, before continuing as before. However, America's 
opposition to any project involving Iran, no matter how small, made such an idea 
unacceptable to the oil companies concerned. 
The Bosporous Bottleneck 
There is one final hurdle facing any proposed route that terminates on the Black Sea: the 
Bosporous. This narrow channel, which passes through the middle of Istanbul, is at times 
only hundreds of metres across, and has two right-angle turns, is the only connection between 
the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Freedom of shipping through the Bosporous having 
been guaranteed by the Montreaux Convention of 1923, there should be no legal challenge to 
Caspian oil being shipped through it. However, when it became clear that the early oil from 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan would be piped to Black Sea ports for onward shipment by 
tanker, Turkey began to protest that the Bosporous would not be able to handle the increased 
number of tankers this would involve. The Turkish government claimed that, since the 
passage of a large (100,000dwt+) tanker required the channel to be closed to all other traffic 
in both directions for a number of hours, there was a concrete limit on the number of such 
transits that could be made in a given period of time. Ankara went on to say that the need to 
accommodate early oil shipments would quickly lead to the achievement of that limit, and 
that such an export route could therefore not be anything other than a short-term solution. 
The Turkish government even went so far as to suggest that it would be forced to introduce 
restrictions on the use of the Bosporous by oil tankers, the Montreaux Convention 
notwithstanding. It justified this by pointing to the significant risk of an environmental 
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catastrophe in the restricted waters of the channel in the event of a tanker accident, the 
likelihood of which would be bound to increase as the number of tanker journeys increased. 
The logic of the Turkish position is essentially unchallenged, although there has been some 
disagreement over the inability of the channel to cope with greater numbers of tankers in the 
long-term. However, it seems that the Turkish government has made more of its 
environmental concerns than it might otherwise have done i f it had not been interested in 
ensuring that Caspian oil be piped to its own terminal at Ceyhan. Nevertheless, whatever the 
real motivation for Turkey's objections to the export of Caspian oil via the Bosporous, the 
fact remains that the Bosporous cannot realistically be included in any long-term export 
plans. 
Bosporous Bypasses 
The effective 'closure' of the Bosporous to Caspian oil in the long-term represented a severe 
blow to Russian ambitions to act as the main transit country for these exports, and a 
significant victory in Turkey's campaign to do so. Russia's internal pipeline network already 
running at or near capacity, it would be impossible to pass the anticipated large volumes of 
Caspian oil through existing pipelines to Europe. So, while Novorossiysk might be able to 
handle early oil exports, it would not be able to handle the much greater volumes expected 
later on, unless a way to get round the problem of the Bosporous could be found. Russia duly 
came up with a way to do exactly that. 
As soon as it became clear that the prevailing opinion in the Caspian oil industry was shifting 
to an acceptance of the Turkish position, and hence the abandonment of plans to use the 
Black Sea ports for the export of the later oil, Russia proposed that a pipeline be built to 
bypass the Bosporous. The Russian proposal, announced in 1994, suggested that a pipeline 
be built from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas to the Greek Aegean port of 
Alexandropoulis. Under the Russian plan, oil piped to the Black Sea ports would be shipped 
by tanker to Burgas, where it would be offloaded into the new pipeline and sent on to 
Alexandropoulis, where it would be loaded onto tankers once more for shipment around the 
world. The Russian government even announced that it had signed agreements with Bulgaria 
and Greece to begin the project, which would be seen as heavy involvement by Russian 
energy companies. 
73 
The proposal was obviously welcomed by the Greek and Bulgarian governments, who i f it 
was implemented, could look forward to receiving significant transit revenues. The plan also 
appealed to the Greek government particularly because it would allow them to deny such 
revenues to Turkey. Greece and Turkey persisting in perceiving their relations in a 'zero-
sum' context,6 both sides accept as fact the idea that anything of benefit to one side can only 
come at the expense of the other. The implementation of a Burgas-Alexandropoulis pipeline 
would therefore be seen as something of a victory for Greece, probably by both sides. 
While at first sight this proposal appeared to resolve the Bosporous issue, and revitalise the 
Russian bid to export Caspian oil long-term, a closer look at the practicalities of the plan gave 
rise to some misgivings. The need to load and unload tankers at three different ports would 
make shipment more expensive, and introduced much higher risks of accidents and 
environmental damage, particularly in the Black Sea. It is also questionable whether it is any 
less risky to have large tankers transiting the restricted and environmentally sensitive waters 
of the Agean than have them passing through the Bosporous. On balance, it seems unlikely 
that the commercial interests involved in the Caspian would adopt the Burgas-
Alexandropoulis route as the main export route for their oil, when a large pipeline 'trunk 
route' to a more accessible terminal was a realistic possibility. 
Baku-Ceyhan 
The front-runner amongst proposals for just such a trunk route is a line proposed by the 
Turkish government, and heavily researched by various Turkish and international commercial 
enterprises. The proposal would see a pipeline run from Baku to Tbilisi and then south into 
Turkey, via Erzerum, to the large Turkish terminal at the port of Ceyhan. 
The proposal has been pushed hard by the Turkish government, unsurprisingly when the 
potential rewards are considered. Such a route would have a strong claim to serve as the 
main export for the bulk of the Caspian's oil exports. In fact, this was obviously the intention 
from the very beginning, as the proposed pipeline would be built with the capacity to handle 
estimated full-stream production both from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan for the foreseeable 
future. The proposal included plans to link a Baku-Ceyhan line with a line from Kazakhstan 
6 Ibid. 
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to Tbilisi, either around the northern coast of the Caspian and then south through Dagestan, 
or via a submarine pipeline across the Caspian seabed. 
The plan is an attractive one for many of the parties involved in the pipelines debate. 
Obviously Turkey would benefit, both from transit revenues, and the fact that contracts to 
build the pipeline across Turkey would almost certainly involve Turkish companies, who 
have built up some expertise in the construction of oil infrastructure. Turkish enterprises 
would be well-placed to bid for construction contracts along the ful l length of the line, for the 
same reasons. A route through Turkey would also serve to link the Caucasus and Central 
Asian states more closely to Turkey, encouraging further economic and political links. 
Finally, having such a route terminate at Ceyhan would make the Turkish port an important 
oil centre for the eastern Mediterranean, as it already handles exports from Iraq, and avoid the 
need for a large increase in tanker traffic through the Bosporous. 
The only real problem facing the Turkish would be the ongoing conflict between its forces 
and ethnic Kurdish guerrilla groups such as the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in the east of 
the country. The central government in Ankara has been waging a frequently very 'dirty' war 
against the Kurdish guerrillas, who are seeking an independent Kurdistan, for years, with no 
sign of a lasting victory for either side. While the proposed route does not pass through the 
heart of Kurdish-controlled territory, a significant stretch would pass through territory heavily 
contested by the two sides. The Kurds having shown themselves willing to launch terrorist 
attacks against such infrastructure targets before, the pipeline would present a major security 
headache for the Turkish army. This would be eased slightly by the fact that it is anticipated 
that the pipeline would follow the route of a major strategic highway that already requires a 
large military presence to maintain security along it. However, it is a fact of life in the 
contested areas that, while the army may control towns and villages during the daylight 
hours, at night the situation may be very different. Unless there were to be a significant 
change in the current situation in the Kurdish areas, a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline could 
face constant disruption by Kurdish guerrillas wishing to force the Turkish government into 
negotiations. For this reason, the Kurds may in fact welcome the adoption of such a route 
almost as much as the Turkish government itself, for the opportunity it may represent for 
political progress. 
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Adoption of the Baku-Ceyhan section of the line by the companies currently looking to 
export from Azerbaijan would heighten the attraction of such a route for the companies 
seeking an export route for Kazakh oil, as most of the hard work would already have been 
done. From the point of view of these international oil companies, a pipeline terminating at 
Ceyhan is probably the most cost-effective option of those so far considered. Built to handle 
much larger volumes of oil from Iraq, Ceyhan already has the capacity to absorb additional 
Caspian oil from both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan without the need to upgrade its existing 
facilities, certainly in the medium-term. 
Kazakhstan would almost certainly welcome the construction of a Baku-Ceyhan pipeline for 
the reasons laid out above. It would bring a convenient and cost-effective export route for 
Kazakh oil that much closer, and a submarine pipeline across the Caspian could mean that the 
bulk of Kazakhstan's oil could be exported independently of Russia i f required. Neither 
should the sovereignty dispute affect prospects for such a submarine pipeline; international 
law is clear that pipeline may be laid across the seabed of another state provided that state's 
interests are not prejudiced, leaving Russia or any other Caspian country without any power 
of veto over such a project. This would be the case even i f a regime of condominium was 
adopted over the central Caspian. Alternatively it would be possible, though technically very 
difficult and expensive, to lay a pipeline between the Azerbaijani and Kazakh 'sectors' of the 
Caspian without crossing the Russian sector, assuming the sea were to be divided. 
For its part, Azerbaijan could hardly wish for a better outcome than the construction of a 
major international pipeline between Baku and Ceyhan. By far the greater part of its ful l -
stream oil exports could be exported via such a route, maximising the country's independence 
from Russia. While the concerns laid out previously regarding Russia's ability to interfere 
with the Baku-Supsa line would still apply, Russia would be much less likely to try to disrupt 
the flow of oil along a route with such wide international backing. Georgia meanwhile would 
benefit from the prospect of growing, long-term transit revenues, with which the Tbilisi 
government would hope to drive the country's own economic recovery, and also achieve 
greater political and economic independence from Russia. Adoption of such a project would 
also strongly suggest that a combined pipeline carrying both Azerbaijani and Kazakh crude 
was almost a certainty. 
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For reasons that wil l by now have become obvious, such a route would represent a severe 
blow to Russian ambitions in the region. At a stroke, it would lose the chance to carry the 
greater part of Azerbaijan's oil, and later possible Kazakhstan's exports as well. Georgia and 
Azerbaijan would no longer be dependent on Russian goodwill to export their most valuable 
commodity, and Moscow would find itself in the unusual position of having to deal fairly 
with its former satellite states, or lose out to its rival Turkey. For similar reasons, a Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline would obviously meet the American approval. Such a route would also 
meet with a fundamental requirement of US energy policy: the diversification of global 
sources of oil supply. Such a diversification of supply would be in the interests of the world 
energy market generally, multiple sources of supply ensuring that the market is insulated 
from 'shocks' in particular oil-producing areas, for instance the Persian Gulf. A new source 
of oil on the scale of the Caspian's estimated reserves would be particularly welcome not 
only to the US but also to Europe and Japan, particularly the latter. Japan's unprecedented 
political involvement in the Gulf War in 1991 was a reflection of the fact that by far the 
greater part of Japan's energy requirements are met by Gulf suppliers. This desire to shift 
supply away from one, unstable source has led to Japanese involvement in plans to pipe oil 
eastwards from the Caspian, which will be discussed in more detail later. 
Kazakhstan's Exports 
Having discussed at some length the options being debated for the export of Azerbaijan's oil, 
this paper wil l now look at the issues surrounding the export of oil from Kazakhstan. While 
many of the issues have already been examined in the Azerbaijani context, Kazakhstan's 
position in relation to Russia is, i f anything, worse than Azerbaijan's. With the exception of 
its border with China, Kazakhstan is completely surrounded by former Soviet states; it has 
frontiers with Russia, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Lying at the heart of Central Asia it is 
hundreds, i f not thousands of kilometres further away from a suitable export terminal than 
either of Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan is also the Central Asian state most deeply 
integrated with Russia; the northern, industrial half of the country has an ethnic Russian 
majority. The country's industrialised areas are linked much more closely with neighbouring 
Russian regions than with the rest of Kazakhstan, and this includes Kazakhstan's pipeline 
network. The result of this close integration is an apparent Kazakh recognition that, for the 
immediate future at least, it wil l not be able to export significant amounts of its oil without 
Russian pipelines. 
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Tengiz-Novorossiysk 
I f there had been any doubts that Kazakhstan would initially be dependent on Russian help i f 
it was to export its oil, then the US oil company Chevron's experiences would have quickly 
dispelled them. Having been the first western company to explore the potential oil wealth of 
the Caspian, first approaching Kazakhstan during the 1980s prior to independence, Chevron 
should have been well-placed to reap major financial rewards when it became possible to 
export Caspian oil outside the former Soviet Union. However, this did not prove to be the 
case. Since Kazakh independence, Russia has consistently obstructed the exportation of 
Kazakh oil, in quite transparent attempts to limit the country's economic and political 
freedom. 
Russia's energy companies and Fuel and Energy Ministry first objected to Kazakh use of 
Russian export pipelines on the basis that the existing network did not have sufficient 
capacity. Then, when it became clear that this was not the case, the Russians were able to 
insist that Chevron invest tens of millions of dollars in a chemical plant to remove 
mercaptans from the Kazakh oil, with the Russians claimed would otherwise damage the 
Russian pipes. The fact that those Russian pipes had carried Kazakh oil for years, apparently 
without any ill-effects, was conveniently forgotten. Currently, despite Chevron's completion 
of a plant to remove the mercaptans, the American company is still being forced to export its 
oil from Kazakhstan by rail and barge rather than through the Russian pipeline network. This 
has led Chevron to reduce its investment in Kazakhstan to a 'care and maintenance' level, 
continuing problems meaning that it is not worth the risk of investing further capital in 
developing the Kazakh oil fields until the export problem can finally be resolved. 
However, there has been some slow progress toward an acceptable export pipeline, to the 
point where the route is decided and construction work has begun. The planned pipeline wil l 
run from Kazakhstan's massive Tengiz field (with somewhere between 6 and 20bn barrels of 
reserves) to the export terminal at Novorossiysk, via Atyrau, Komsomolsk and Tikhoretsk. 
Although Soviet-era pipeline will form the basis for much of the route, the Komsomolsk-
Tikhorestsk section wil l have to be built from scratch, while as discussed previously, the 
existing Tikhoretsk-Novorossiysk section wil l require extensive upgrading and 
modernisation. 
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The Kazakh government has been forced to be more pragmatic than Azerbaijan over its 
pipelines, as the only feasible option currently available, the route described above, is entirely 
under Russian control. Kazakhstan has therefore been less ready to openly challenge Russia 
over the Caspian sovereignty issue, or over Russia's 'right' to benefit from the export of 
Caspian oi l . 7 And in the same way, Kazakhstan has chosen not to demand fair access to the 
Russian pipeline network, or challenge Moscow's insistence that while it will only pay 
former Soviet prices for Kazakh oil, Kazakhstan must import Russian oil at world 
commercial prices. Kazakhstan is required to import Russian oil as its own pipeline network 
does not supply the eastern half of the country, which is therefore dependent on Russian 
energy supplies. Instead, the Almaty government and Chevron find themselves having to 
play a waiting game, going ahead with a pipeline that wi l l leave Russia's hand firmly on the 
tap in the meantime, and accepting inflated Russian transit fees, while quietly trying to find a 
non-Russian alternative. In the meantime, being able to export commercially significant 
amounts of early oil via Novorossiysk, even i f the cost of exporting it wi l l be higher than 
usual and the returns consequently lower, wil l provide welcome revenues for the Kazakh 
government and reassure Chevron's shareholders that the large amounts of money invested so 
far have not been wasted. 
As mentioned previously, one alternative to the Tengiz-Novorossiysk route would be to link a 
Kazakh export pipeline into a pipeline running south from Azerbaijan. Such a link would 
probably only be justifiable i f it were to be used for the export of the much larger volumes of 
oil expected in the medium- to long-term. The benefits of such a pipeline would be 
significant. 
The construction of a large trunk pipeline stretching from Ceyhan in the south to Tengiz in 
the north, although requiring a great deal of investment initially, would quickly prove to be 
more cost-effective than any other combination of routes proposed so far. One set of pipes 
following a single route would have the capacity to carry all of the combined output expected 
from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the medium-term. The oil would not have to pass 
through the Bosporous, nor would there be any need to risk transferring oil from pipeline to 
tanker and back again in order to avoid the Bosporous. The oil would simply be pumped 
7 See Chapter 3, footnote 11. 
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directly from the well-heads in Tengiz or Azerbaijan's offshore fields to waiting tankers in 
Ceyhan, arriving more quickly, unaffected by the weather, and cheaper. 
There are three variants to the proposal to link a Kazakh export pipeline to an Azerbaijani 
one. The first, and certainly the cheapest, would be to build a short spur from Komsomolsk 
to Makhachkala, in Dagestan and then pipe the oil to Tbilisi, from where it would be routed 
to Erzerum in Turkey and on to Ceyhan. This would have the advantage of being the easiest 
and quickest to complete, but would not free Kazakhstan from Russian control over its 
exports. 
Two other variants have been proposed. Firstly, a submarine pipeline could be laid from 
Kazakhstan's Caspian shore at Aktau directly south-west across the seabed to Makhachkala, 
from where a new pipeline would carry the oil direct to Tbilisi, where it would join with a 
line from Baku before being pumped on to Ceyhan as described before. However, although 
the construction of a submarine pipeline across the Caspian at this point would be relatively 
simple, the seabed never exceeding 75m in depth, it would again involve the pipeline 
crossing Russian territory as it passed through Dagestan. Alternatively, a line could be run 
south from Tengiz along the eastern shore of the Caspian into Turkmenistan, from where a 
submarine pipeline could be laid across the much deeper southern Caspian. This would allow 
Kazakhstan to export its oil without crossing Russian territory, but would be the most 
expensive of the variants, involving the laying of pipe down to as deep as 270m. However, 
construction of the southern submarine pipeline would allow Turkmenistan to export some of 
its oil via Azerbaijan and Turkey, thus avoiding the need to go through Iran or even less 
attractive routes, as discussed later. It should also be remembered that such a line could more 
than compensate for the cost of its construction it its political advantages are taken into 
account. The very existence of an alternative to a Russian route would allow Kazakhstan to 
press for much fairer terms from Moscow for the export of its oil via Russian pipelines, thus 
granting the Kazakh government much greater economic independence. 
South to Iran 
One option that has not been explored in particular depth is that Kazakhstan could build a 
pipeline south through Turkmenistan to Iran. Such a route would represent the shortest route 
to a recognised oil terminal, in this case an Iranian port on the Persian Gulf. Such a route 
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would obviously also be beneficial for both Turkmenistan and Iran. Turkmenistan would be 
able to 'piggyback' its own exports on the Kazakh ones, while Iran would not only gain 
politically from such a decision, but would also see Central Asian oil reaching its 
underdeveloped north, more cheaply than i f Iran were to pipe its own oil north from the Gulf. 
Such a route would also very likely become the basis for a gas line south from 
Turkmenistan's huge gas deposits, a much more important consideration for the Ashgabat 
government. 
However, there is one obvious obstacle in the way of any pipeline across Iran: the US 
governments continuing economic and political sanctions against Iran. This point wi l l be 
discussed in more detail below, when Turkmenistan's pipeline options are considered. 
Eastwards to China 
One final option for the export of Kazakh oil has been explored, the initial proposal being 
announced in a blaze of publicity to a shocked oil industry. In October 1997, the Chinese and 
Kazakh governments and national oil companies announced an agreement whereby China 
would fund a US$3bn pipeline east to China (as well as investing up to a further US$6bn in 
renovating two large Kazakh oil fields). The project, which could take as long as 25 years to 
complete, would see Kazakhstan exporting the greater part of its oil to China, which has 
recently become a net importer of oil. The project, certainly the grandest of all the Caspian 
pipeline proposals, through not the most far-fetched (see below) would seem to meet the 
needs of both parties perfectly. Kazakhstan would be importing its oil direct to one of the 
world's largest, and growing economies, completely independently of any Russian 
involvement. It would receive world market prices for its oil, and an almost guaranteed 
market for as much as oil as it is likely to be able to supply. The new pipeline would also 
serve to integrate the currently separate pipeline networks in the two halves of Kazakhstan. 
China would meanwhile be able to import oil from Kazakhstan more cheaply, in the long-
term, than wil l be possible from its own underdeveloped oil reserves in the north-east of the 
country, or from abroad. China would also see the additional benefit that the proposed 
pipeline would also serve those fields in the north-east, making the transport of the Chinese 
oil cheaper. Finally, should the Chinese market not be able to absorb all the Kazakh oil for 
any reason, Japan would almost certainly represent a ready market, being almost entirely 
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dependent on Gulf oil at present, and therefore very vulnerable to political instability in the 
region. 
The only real obstacles to China are the distance involved and the need to route the pipeline 
through the mountains between the two countries in order to avoid Russia. Widespread 
public perception to the contrary, the Chinese government could quite easily raise the finance 
for the project, and there would be no international opposition to a move that would bind 
China more closely to its neighbours in Asia and to world markets. The existence of a 
Chinese pipeline would be unlikely to affect Kazakhstan's need to export some of its oil 
westwards, via Russia or otherwise, as it would not make sense to try to sell to European 
customers via the Far East. But in the same way as a Caspian undersea pipeline, the 
existence of the Chinese route would force Russia to deal more fairly with Kazakhstan over 
its westward exports. 
Exports from Turkmenistan 
Turkmenistan's government since independence having been firmly in the hands of its former 
Communist leader, (now) President Niyazov, Turkmenistan has pursued a firmly pro-Russian 
course in its foreign policy. Turkmen exports of gas to its former Soviet neighbours have 
continued generally uninterrupted (at least for political reasons). However, this has not meant 
that President Niyazov's regime has not also been pursuing the export of the country's vast 
gas reserves to more lucrative customers on the world market. On 6 April 1994, President 
Niyazov ceremonially laid the first foundation stone of what was touted as a Grand Trunk 
Gas Line from Turkmenistan, across Iran to Turkey. However, little work has been done on 
the line since, the economic realities of the American embargo on Iran having reasserted 
themselves. 
The fact remains that any large-scale pipeline project would almost certainly be dependent on 
the involvement of a large, American-based multinational oil company. In the current 
political climate, such involvement in a pipeline through Iran would be impossible. This 
therefore means that any Grand Trunk Gas Line through Iran would also currently be 
impossible, and wil l remain so for the foreseeable future. But Turkmenistan still needs to 
export its gas. Therefore, a series of more modest projects have been discussed, which might 
eventually prove to the West, and particularly the US, that Iran can be trusted to act in good 
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faith as a partner in such agreement. A combination of such projects might also create a 
'virtual' export route across Iran to Turkey, in the form of bilateral deals between Iran and 
Turkmenistan, and Iran and Turkey, and subsequent oil swap deals along the corridor thus 
created. A Turkmenistan - Iran - Turkey line would be the most secure and cheapest of any 
of the pipeline routes so far proposed, and i f the principle could be proven to be sound, 
foreign investment could quickly follow. 
One factor that may work in Iran's favour when such a route is discussed is the fact that it 
would be in Iran's interests to keep the line running because it would almost certainly be 
exporting its own gas at the same time. This would provide some guarantee or Iranian good 
behaviour. Also, Washington wil l be reluctant to be seen to be harming Turkmenistan's 
economic prospects for the sake of cutting Iran out of a commercial project that would not 
involve giving Iran any particularly sensitive technology. 
The fact is that a route across Iran, either to Turkey or to the Persian Gulf would be in the 
interests of all the parties involved in the pipeline issue, except Russia and America. Turkey, 
Iran and Turkmenistan would obviously all benefit from the project: Turkmenistan would sell 
its gas for hard currency, Iran would receive transit fees, be able to export its own gas, and 
move a step closer to international rehabilitation, and Turkey would have two convenient 
suppliers to meet its rapidly expanding need for gas. The region's other exporters would also 
benefit in the long term, simply by the success of such a route. It would open the way for 
similar routes through Iran for both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan i f they became necessary, and 
therefore act as a further guarantee of Russian good behaviour towards those pipelines across 
its territory. Unfortunately, such a pipeline would probably seem to represent too much an 
Iranian diplomatic victory for Washington to allow it to go ahead, at least at present. 
However, America recently agreed that it would not prosecute European countries for 
involvement in projects with Iran, so it may be that Washington is prepared to see such 
projects be implemented, as long as American companies are not associated with them. 
South-East to Afghanistan 
One final pipeline proposal that deserves mention is a proposal from Saudi Arabia's Unocal, 
America's Delta Oil and Russia's Gazprom that was unveiled in October 1995, that would see 
a pipeline run south-east through Afghanistan to Pakistan. The route would pass through 
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regions of Afghanistan held by the Taleban movement, who at the time of writing were well 
on their way to controlling most of the country. It would be easy to dismiss such a route as 
impractical, largely because of the threat to the route posed by the local warring factions, 
possible including the Islamic fundamentalist Taleban themselves. However, Taleban has 
received constant (possibly direct, military) support in its military campaigns from Pakistan, 
and is rumoured to receive financial assistance from a number of wealthy Saudis, so it would 
not be unreasonable to assume some sort of deal could be struck to secure the line's future. It 
should also be remembered that commercial interests have traditionally not been afraid to 
make deals with local warlords, for instance the companies that drove railroads across Latin 
America and Asia in the late 19 th century.8 However, the current instability of Afghanistan 
makes it unlikely that the large international banks would be prepared to finance such a risky 
undertaking. 
Other Factors 
Having completed an analysis of the various interests at work in support of each of the 
pipeline routes discussed, a number of other factors must be taken into account, before some 
general conclusions are drawn concerning the potential winners and losers of the pipelines 
competition. 
The first of these is the current extremely low price of oil on the world market. Despite 
continued predictions of growth in demand for oil and oil derivatives, prices are now the 
lowest they have been for some years. I f prices were to remain as low as they are now for the 
foreseeable future, international interest in Caspian oil may wane, although certainly only 
temporarily. Nevertheless, any delay in progress towards full production could prove 
extremely costly to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In the absence of the hard 
currency oil and gas exports would bring, these countries wi l l remain economically and 
politically dependent on Russia. The longer such dependence continues, the harder it wil l be 
to overcome later on, particularly i f the Russian economy begins to improve, however 
unlikely this may appear at present. Continued difficulties also pose a genuine security threat 
to the region, as the hardships such difficulties impose tend to encourage hard-line 
nationalism, and dispute between neighbouring states and communities. 
Roberts, J, (1996) Caspian Pipelines, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
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Perhaps an even more significant threat to the development i f Caspian oil is the possible 
resumption of oil exports from Iraq9, whether under UN auspices in exchange for 
humanitarian suppliers, or purely commercially. The latter case would almost certainly 
prevent further development of the Caspian oil industry. Iraq holds reserves perhaps ten 
times as large as the whole Caspian basin, and the infrastructure to export that oil is already 
in place. I f Iraqi oil were to come fully on stream in a short space of time, the resulting fall in 
world oil prices would make the exploitation of Caspian oil seem commercially much less 
attractive. However, i f Iraq's return to the oil market were to take place in stages, therefore 
avoiding a significant drop in world prices, the Caspian states would still have the 
opportunity to push ahead with the development of their oil industries and the construction of 
at least a few of the pipelines described above. Once such projects were underway, they 
would be completed and used whether or not Iraq returned to the oil market, most of the 
money on their construction having already been spent. At that point the commercial 
enterprises involved would continue with their exports in order to recoup some of their 
investment and generate income. Nevertheless, the Caspian states cannot afford many further 
delays in the construction of export pipelines, or they may 'miss the boat' entirely. 
Potential Winners and Losers 
Having analysed the main routes proposed for the export of the Caspian's oil reserves, and 
the various interests that would be served by each of them, it should be possible to suggest 
which routes are most likely to be adopted. In doing so, some conclusions wil l also be 
possible regarding which actors in the pipeline debate are likely to benefit most, and why. 
The adoption of two pipelines for the export of Azerbaijan's early oil was, as discussed 
earlier, a US-imposed compromise between Azerbaijan's desire to see at least some of its oil 
exported independently of Russia, and the recognition that Russia would have to be involved, 
or it might be tempted to use its dominant position to disrupt exports. This allows one 
obvious conclusion to be drawn: that while Russia retains the ability to disrupt oil exports, by 
whatever means, Moscow's agenda will have to be a primary consideration in any pipeline 
decision. This wi l l be a continuing geopolitical fact of life for the other actors in the region, 
and may remain so even after full-scale exports begin. Russia will probably always be the 
9 Ibid. 
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dominant military and political power in the former Soviet space, simply by virtue of its size 
and position. 
However, the Twin Track decision also demonstrated that America can in certain 
circumstances be persuaded to act in the interest of the other states in the region, even i f in 
doing so it goes against Russian interests. In fact, the decision may have signalled the end of 
America's apparent 'Russia first' policy in the region. This wi l l provide welcome 
encouragement to the newly-independent states, and suggest that it may be possible for them 
to distance themselves from Russia both economically and politically sooner rather than later. 
And despite the apparent Russian victory in the decision to route more of Azerbaijan's oil 
through Russia than Georgia, the existence of a southern route will perhaps force Russia to 
act fairly in all its dealings with Azerbaijan, rather than risk that oil being diverted 
southwards. This should allow Azerbaijan more independence in its policies, while income 
from oil exports should begin to improve the country's economic situation. Unfortunately, 
that income could also serve to destabilise the region still further, i f Azerbaijan chooses to 
spend its new wealth on an arms build-up with the aim of driving Armenian forces out of 
occupied Azerbaijan. 
The most likely of the future, larger pipelines, with the possible exception of the Kazakh-
Chinese route, which remains something of an unknown quantity, seems to be Tengiz-Ceyhan 
line, joining with a line from Baku in Georgia. This route makes the most commercial sense, 
and would be in the interests of most of the actors involved, even i f it passed through Russian 
territory. The pipeline would have to be run to international commercial standards, there 
being too many actors involved to allow Russia any opportunity to try to impose its own 
terms on Kazakhstan, as it has done up to now. Kazakhstan would be able to export its oil at 
normal world prices, and Azerbaijan would have an entirely non-Russian export route with 
major international backing. Georgia and Turkey, meanwhile, would benefit from the major 
transit revenues that such a pipeline would bring, and Turkey would have succeeded in its 
campaign to act as a gateway between Europe and Central Asia. The only parties who would 
not obviously benefit from such a pipeline would be Iran and Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan 
faces one major hurdle to the export of its gas: American opposition to the use of Iran as a 
transit country. Yet i f America continues to oppose such a project, it is effectively 
condemning Turkmenistan to years of reliance on former Soviet customers who simply 
cannot afford to pay market prices, and hence economic stagnation. It is ironic that the leader 
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of the free world, and a vocal supporter of the independence of the newly-independent states, 
is currently blocking moves towards such independence in order to pursue its own interests. 
It can be concluded then that America, as the only global superpower, actually holds the 
dominant position in the Caspian pipeline issue. It was able to insist that two pipelines were 
used to export Azerbaijan's oil, in support of its own policies in the region, and it is currently 
able to prevent the construction of any pipeline (again with the possible exception of the line 
to China) which conflicts with those policies. What is perhaps more interesting for the 
purposes of this paper is the fact that Russia, despite apparent conflicts between its foreign 
and energy ministries, and the failure of its own economy and civil society, has still largely 
been able to impose its wil l on the other Caspian states. The Russian government has been 
able to use the hard fact that these countries still depend on Russia for most of their trade, and 
are reliant on infrastructure controlled by the Russians, to secure its own position at the heart 
of the future exploitation of the Caspian oil reserves. This has serious implications for the 
future independence of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in particular. 
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Chapter 5 
Some Final Conclusions 
Having examined the geopolitical influences at work in both the sovereignty and pipeline 
disputes between the five littoral states of the Caspian, it should be possible to draw some 
general conclusions on the wider geopolitical environment in the region. 
It is clear from both analysis that America and the American oil companies occupy the 
dominant position in the dispute over pipeline routes. This is largely a function of capital: 
only the American oil companies have access to the large amounts of finance needed to 
undertake projects of such scale. The American government, meanwhile, is the dominant 
voice at the World Bank, and hence is able to veto any government borrowing of which it 
does not approve, for instance for a Turkmen gas pipeline across Iran. However, Russia was 
able to force the use of a Russian pipeline route from Azerbaijan, despite Baku's wish to the 
contrary, by making it clear that it would be prepared to cause trouble for the other Caspian 
states, and the international oil companies, i f it was not included. It was apparently only 
reluctantly that America intervened to impose the use of another route, and this gives some 
idea of the geopolitical realities in the Caspian. While the Americans may indeed have the 
capability to impose their ideas on the Caspian states, they have generally been unwilling to 
do so. This has given the Russians the opportunity to reassert themselves and recapture their 
former leading role in the region, although the practical benefits of this success are limited by 
the need not to directly confront America's wider interest in the region. 
Meanwhile, it would appear that the newly-independent littoral states, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will all face serious challenges to their future economic and 
political independence. Al l of them remain reliant on Russian goodwill to export their oil, 
and look likely to do so for the foreseeable future. This situation wil l severely curtail their 
ability to disregard the Russian government's interests when those interests conflict with their 
own. However, as more of the various pipelines come on-stream, and export incomes 
increase, they should be able to push ahead with domestic economic reforms, increasing 
stability throughout the region. 
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The final outcome of the pipelines dispute will probably be the existence of a number of 
pipelines serving each exporter. This wil l be the result of a conscious effort by the 
multinational oil companies to 'spread their bets' to cover all the political and economic 
angles. The existence of more than one export route for each exporting country should allow 
them to insist on fairer treatment by Russia, particularly i f one of their options is entirely non-
Russian, or a major international project like the proposed Tengiz-Ceyhan line. 
As for the sovereignty dispute, recent statements from the Russian government would appear 
to suggest that there is growing acceptance in Moscow of the inevitability of delimitation of 
the Caspian into national zones. The proposal that each country have a 45nm national zone 
and that the central area of the sea be held in common has been shelved. This was possibly 
prompted by the continuing dispute over oil fields in the central area between Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan, which made it clear that where oil revenues are involved, even a Russian ally 
like President Niyazov wil l follow the money rather than blindly follow Russia's lead. This 
apparent blow to Russian hopes of direct access to the Caspian's oil reserves wil l have been 
softened, however, by Moscow's success in involving Russian companies in the various 
consortia now operating in the Caspian. Every major consortium, whether operating in 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan now has a significant Russian presence. This may 
have allowed the Russian Fuel and Energy Ministry to push for a rapid resolution of the 
sovereignty issue in order to allow more rapid progress in the exploitation of the sea's 
hydrocarbons. 
The wider implications of any decision to completely partition the Caspian are harder to 
judge. This outcome would certainly represent a victory for international law, precedent in 
similar disputes being overwhelmingly in favour of such a division. It would also be a 
victory for the oil producing states, who wil l gain unfettered access to the Caspian oil fields 
on their own terms, rather than under Russian control. However, as the recent Azerbaijani-
Turkmen dispute over the 'Azeri' and 'Chirag' fields demonstrates, delimination is likely to 
be fraught with its own difficulties. In that particular case, however, the fact that an 
international consortium is already operating in the fields concerned may in fact assist in the 
resolution of the dispute, as neither state will wish to delay production. 
It should also be borne in mind that delimination would mean the end of one regional power's 
hopes in the region. Delimitation would represent the worst possible case for Iran, who 
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would have been excluded from commercial involvement in the region by America, while 
simultaneously losing direct access to that oil, known reserves in the Iranian sector being 
negligible. Iranian opposition to such an outcome is therefore almost guaranteed, and while 
this may not prevent de facto delimitation, it wil l certainly prevent a de jure settlement. 
Currently, though, it would seem that the absence of such an agreement wil l not prevent 
initial oil production, although it may present a hurdle to any long-term investment plans. 
Finally, it is interesting to note the interaction between the two disputes. Russia in particular 
has proved highly skilled in using a position of strength in one arena to forward its interests 
in the other. The apparently contradictory policies of the Russian Energy and Foreign 
Ministries may in fact have worked to Russia's advantage in the long run. President Yeltsin's 
government has been able to negotiate favourable Russian entry into every one of the major 
oil production consortia by using the threat of continued diplomatic action over the 
sovereignty dispute. Unwilling to risk further unnecessary delays in their progress towards 
full production, the consortia have quietly acquiesced to Russian bids for a stake in their 
projects. And in the same way, by turning up the diplomatic pressure over the sovereignty 
row, Russia has been able to impose the use of Russian pipelines for some of those exports. 
Similarly, the Russian government was able to use its monopoly over existing pipelines to 
sustain effective opposition to delimitation until it could be sure that it would benefit 
commercially. The success of such manipulations represents a success for the realist policy 
makers of the Kremlin, who have demonstrated that they are not afraid to use diplomatic 
pressure, rather than negotiation in good faith, to achieve their aims. 
Hopefully, the preceding chapters will have demonstrated that the geopolitical environment in 
the Caspian basin is a complex one, made up of a web of conflicting interests. However, it 
should be clear from the analysis contained in this paper that some clear strands become 
apparent from a study of the interaction of those interests and the result on the ground (or 
sea). Unsurprisingly, it has emerged that America, in its role as the world's biggest free-
market economy and global superpower, has the ability to shape events in the Caspian 
according to its own interests. In this instance, this ability is a function of America's 
financial strength, although 1997's US paratroop jump into Kazakhstan proved that the region 
is not beyond the reach of America's military. Nevertheless, it is also clear that Russia has 
managed to retain its ability to impose its will in the former Soviet Union at least, i f not 
always as easily as it was during the Soviet era. 
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To draw these conclusions back to our initial analysis of geopolitical theories, the Caspian 
basin provides a prime example of the overlapping spheres of interest, and differing levels of 
state 'entropy' described in Cohen (1992). At the same time, though, it also supports the 
critical geopoliticians' claim that non-state actors, in this case multinational oil companies, 
can be as important i f not more so than governments. So perhaps it would be sensible to 
conclude that the Caspian, rather than fitting neatly into a particular world model, is a prime 
example of the sort of changing geopolitical environment which has driven the recent debate 
between realist and critical geopoliticians. Perhaps the outcomes of the sovereignty and 
pipeline debates will provide a wider insight into the relative merits of these opposing world 
views. 
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